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Abstract.We present True2F, a system for second-factor authen-
tication that provides the benefits of conventional authentication
tokens in the face of phishing and software compromise, while
also providing strong protection against token faults and back-
doors. To do so, we develop new lightweight two-party protocols
for generating cryptographic keys and ECDSA signatures, and we
implement new privacy defenses to prevent cross-origin token-
fingerprinting attacks. To facilitate real-world deployment, our
system is backwards-compatible with today’s U2F-enabled web
services and runs on commodity hardware tokens after a firmware
modification. A True2F-protected authentication takes just 57ms
to complete on the token, compared with 23ms for unprotected
U2F.
1 Introduction
Two-factor authentication has become a standard defense against
weak passwords, keyloggers, and other types of malware. Uni-
versal Second Factor (U2F) hardware authentication tokens are
an especially effective type of second-factor authenticator. Be-
cause these tokens cryptographically bind their authentication
messages to a specific origin, they block phishing attacks to
which other approaches, such as time-based one-time passwords
(e.g., Google Authenticator), leave users exposed. These tokens
run on simple, dedicated hardware, and so they present a much
smaller attack surface than mobile-phone-based methods do.
Since Google mandated in early 2017 that all of its employees
use U2F authentication tokens, the company has not discovered
a single instance of corporate credential theft [77].
But the introduction of new, and often opaque, hardware
components into a system carries additional risks as well. If these
components are poorly designed or even intentionally backdoored,
they can undermine the security of an otherwise well-functioning
system. A now-infamous bug in the design of Infineon-made
cryptographic chips led to critical vulnerabilities in millions of
TPMs, electronic passports, laptops, and hardware tokens [94].
Users of these flawed Infineon chips ended up worse off than
those who just implemented their cryptographic routines using
standard software libraries.
The consequences of faulty or backdoored hardware authen-
tication tokens can be equally dire. If a token’s randomness
source is faulty—a common failure mode for low-cost de-
vices [52, 68, 80, 126]—then anyone who phishes a user’s creden-
tials can authenticate as that user, evenwithout access to the user’s
machine. An attacker who compromises a hardware token during
manufacturing or via supply-chain tampering [38, 58, 98, 107]
can exfiltrate the user’s cryptographic credentials or authenti-
cation history (e.g., to an attacker-controlled web service). The
Figure 1: A development board
that runs our True2F prototype
(at left) and a production USB
token capable of running True2F
(above).
latest batch of web standards [115, 119, 131] allow using hard-
ware tokens for password-less “first-factor” authentication, which
only exacerbates these dangers.
This raises the question: Can we enjoy the benefits of hardware-
level security protections without incurring the risks of introduc-
ing additional (and often untrustworthy) hardware components
into our systems? In this paper, we give a strong positive an-
swer to this question for the interesting special case of hardware
authentication tokens.
We present the design and implementation of True2F, a system
for two-factor authentication that simultaneously provides the
benefits of conventional second-factor authentication hardware
tokens and very strong protection against the risks of token faults
or backdoors. True2F requires only modest modifications to
the token firmware and browser software. Critical for enabling
incremental deployment is that True2F runs on unmodified token
hardware and is backwards compatible with online services
that already support U2F; using True2F requires no server-side
changes whatsoever.
True2F uses the same authentication process as U2F: a relying
party (i.e., web service) sends a challenge to the user’s browser,
the browser forwards the challenge to a hardware token via USB,
and the token returns a signature on the challenge to the relying
party via the browser. The only difference is that a True2F-
compliant token and browser exchange a few extra messages
before responding to the relying party. These messages allow
the browser to enforce the token’s correct behavior, preventing a
malicious token from choosing weak or preloaded keys, or from
covertly leaking keying material in messages to the relying party.
The True2F token provides the same level of protection against
phishing and browser compromise as a standard U2F hardware
authentication token does. After the user has registered the token
with a relying party, even if the attacker takes control of the user’s
machine, the attacker still cannot authenticate to the relying party
without interacting with the token. This holds even if the attacker
can passively observe the browser’s interactions with the token
1
ar
X
iv
:1
81
0.
04
66
0v
4 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
1 A
ug
 20
19
before taking control of the machine.
True2F additionally protects against token backdoors. If the
browser executes the True2F protocol correctly, then even if the
adversary controls a coalition of relying parties, the relying parties
cannot detect whether they are interacting with an adversarial
U2F token or an ideal (honest) U2F token. In particular, the
token cannot exfiltrate data to the outside world via U2F protocol
messages.
With True2F, to compromise the cryptographic keys on the
token, an attacker has to compromise both the user’s machine and
the hardware token itself. In this way, True2F provides “strongest-
link” security, while standard U2F provides security that is only
as good as the hardware token itself.
The design of True2F takes advantage of the fact that U2F
hardware tokens perform only very simple computations: a U2F
token generates keypairs for the ECDSA digital signature scheme,
it signs server-provided challenges, and it keeps a counter to track
how many authentications it has performed.
We develop lightweight two-party protocols that allow the
token and browser to collaboratively execute all of these opera-
tions in such a way that (1) the browser learns nothing about the
token’s secrets and yet (2) the browser can enforce the token’s
strict compliance with the U2F specification. Our security def-
initions draw on the recent theoretical work on cryptographic
firewalls [47, 87] and algorithm-substitution attacks [11].
In particular, we develop a new collaborative key-generation
protocol that runs between the browser and token. The browser
uses this protocol to ensure that the token’s master keypair
incorporates proper randomness. Our protocol is inspired by, but
is roughly 3× faster than, a scheme of prior work [37].
We introduce verifiable identity families, a mechanism for
deterministically deriving an exponential number of random-
looking ECDSA keypairs from a single master keypair. We use
this primitive in True2F to derive the per-website keypairs used
for U2F authentication in a deterministic and browser-auditable
way.
We also construct firewalled ECDSA signatures, which allow
the browser and token to jointly produce ECDSA signatures on
messages (1) without revealing any of the token’s secrets to the
browser and (2) while preventing the token from exfiltrating
secrets via the bits of the signature. This prevents an adversarial
token from tampering with the randomness used to generate the
signatures and from encoding bits of secret information (e.g.,
the token’s signing keys) in the randomness of the signature it-
self [127]. The innovation is that our protocol outputs unmodified
ECDSA signatures, which is critical for backwards compatibil-
ity. In Section 9, we explain how our construction relates to
subliminal-free [44, 45, 46, 108, 109] and subversion-resistant
signature schemes [6].
Finally, we implement a flash-friendly counting data structure
that we use to implement the U2F authentication counters. As we
will describe, using finer-grained counters better protects the user
from cross-site token-fingerprinting attacks. To make it practical
to keep fine-grained counters, we propose a new log-structured
counter design that respects the tight design and space constraints
of our token’s flash hardware.
We have implemented the full True2F protocol and run it on a
hardware token used by Google employees (Figure 1). On this
token, a True2F authentication completes in 57ms, compared
with 23ms for a standard U2F authentication. Registering the
True2F token with a new website takes 109ms, compared with
64ms for a standard U2F registration.
Secondary application: Hardware wallets. While our focus is
on authentication tokens, the principles of True2F also apply
to protecting cryptocurrency “hardware wallets” against back-
doors [19, 107]. Hardware wallets perform essentially the same
operations as U2F tokens: ECDSA key generation and signing.
When using True2F in the context of hardware wallets, the user
would store the token’s master secret key in cold storage for
backup. Otherwise, the application to hardware wallets is almost
immediate, and we do not discuss it further.
2 Background
The primary goal of the Universal Second Factor (U2F) [54, 79]
standard is to defeat credential-phishing attacks [69] by requiring
users of web services to authenticate not only with a human-
memorable password (“the first factor”) but also using a cryp-
tographic secret stored on a hardware token (“a second factor”).
Even if the user accidentally discloses their login credentials to
an attacker, the attacker cannot access the user’s account without
also having physical access to the hardware token. All major web
browsers support U2F, as do many popular web services such as
Gmail, Facebook, Dropbox, and Github [115, 119, 129, 131].
Three entities make up a U2F deployment:
1. a hardware token, which is a small USB device, as in
Figure 1, that stores cryptographic keys and computes digital
signatures,
2. a web browser that serves as the user’s interface to the token
and the web, and
3. a relying party (i.e., service) to which the user wants to
authenticate.
The U2F protocol specifies two actions: registration and
authentication. Both actions begin when the relying party makes
a U2F request to the browser via a JavaScript API. The browser
annotates the request with connection metadata, forwards it to
the U2F token via USB, and displays a prompt to the user, who
physically touches the token to complete the request.
Registration.Registration associates a particular hardware token
with a user’s account at a relying party (e.g., user@github.com).
During registration the relying party sends an application iden-
tifier (e.g., github.com) and a challenge to the token, as in
Figure 2. The token then generates a “per-identity” ECDSA
keypair (skid, pkid), and returns the public key pkid to the relying
party via the browser. Since a single user may have multiple
accounts with the same relying party, the identity id corresponds
to an account-site pair, such as user@github.com.
The token also returns an opaque blob, called the “key handle,”
to the relying party. The relying party stores the public key
pkid and key handle alongside the user’s credentials. During
authentication, the relying party passes this key handle back to
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Figure 2: U2F registration (top) and authentication (bottom).
the token as part of its authentication request. The token can use
the key-handle blob to reduce the amount of keying material it
needs to store. For example, Yubico’s U2F key [128] derives a
per-identity secret key by applying a pseudorandom function [63],
keyed with a global secret key, to the identity’s key handle.
U2F also supports a simple form of hardware attestation. For
privacy reasons, the Chrome browser essentially disables this
feature and True2F follows Chrome’s behavior [35].
Authentication. During authentication, the relying party sends
to the browser the key handle produced at registration, the
application identifier appID, and a challenge for the token to sign
(Figure 2). The browser constructs a challenge with the relying
party’s challenge and connection metadata, and forwards the key
handle and appID to the token. The token uses the key handle to
recover the per-identity secret signing key skid. In addition, the
token reads and increments a counter it stores locally. Finally,
the token uses skid to sign the browser’s challenge along with the
application ID and counter value.
The counter defends against physical cloning attacks. If an
attacker clones a hardware token, then the original token and the
clonewill have the same counter value. If both tokens authenticate,
then the relying party can notice that the counter has not increased
(or possibly has decreased) and lock the account. U2F does
not specify how the counter must be implemented—the only
requirement is that the counter reported at each authentication
attempt to a given relying party must be strictly increasing.
Yubico’s U2F key uses a single global counter [128].
3 Design overview
In this section, we sketch the high-level design ideas behind
True2F and then describe our security goals for the system.
3.1 From a “Straw-man” to True2F
A simple way to prevent a backdoored hardware token from
misbehaving would be to make its behavior deterministic: after
purchasing the token, the user would load a single seed into
the token. The token would then deterministically derive all
of its randomness and cryptographic secrets from this seed
using a pseudorandom generator. If the user stored the same
cryptographic seed on the browser, the browser could mimic the
behavior of the token, and could thus detect whether the token
ever deviated from the U2F specification.
This “straw-man” solution has a number of critical drawbacks.
First, to be able to audit the token, the browser must store the seed.
If an attacker ever compromises the browser, the attacker can
steal the seed and use it to learn all of the token’s cryptographic
secrets. Storing the seed on the browser would then completely
defeat the purpose of having a hardware token in the first place.
We address this first issue using a new primitive that we call a
verifiable identity family (Section 4.2). When the user initializes
the token, she generates a master keypair (msk,mpk), consisting
of a secret key and a public key. The user loads the master
secret key onto the token and stores the master public key on the
browser. When the browser initiates the U2F registration protocol
for an identity id, the token then uses the master secret key
msk to deterministically generate a unique (but random-looking)
authentication keypair (skid, pkid). Using the master public key
mpk, the browser can verify that pkid really is the unique public
key that corresponds to identity id. In this way, the browser
can verify that the token is generating its cryptographic keys
according to our specification.
But even this solution is imperfect: if the user generates
the master keypair (msk,mpk) on her computer, traces of the
master secret key might be left in memory or swap files on
her machine [33, 39, 59]. Malware that later compromises the
browser could recover the master secret key msk and thereby
learn all of the token’s cryptographic secrets.
To address this second issue, we use a new collaborative key-
generation protocol to generate the master keypair (Section 4.3).
At the end of the protocol, the token holds the master secret
key and the browser holds the master public key. The protocol
further enforces that (a) the keypair is sampled from the correct
distribution and (b) the browser learns nothing except the master
public key. By using this protocol for key generation, the browser
can ensure that the token uses a master key that incorporates
sufficient randomness and the token ensures the browser never
sees its cryptographic secrets.
Even these two improvements are still not quite sufficient to
achieve a fully backdoor-resistant U2F token. The last remaining
issue is the ECDSA signature that the token produces in response
to each authentication request. Since ECDSA signatures are
randomized, a faulty token could use bad randomness to generate
the signatures. In addition, a malicious token could leak bits of
information (e.g., about its master secret key) by hiding them in
the bits of the signature [21, 29, 44, 45, 46, 108, 109].
To ensure that the token uses proper signing randomness and
to eliminate covert channels in the signatures, we introduce
firewalled ECDSA signatures (Section 4.4). To produce a fire-
walled signature, the token (holding a secret signing key sk and
message m) and browser (holding a public verification key pk
and message m) run an interactive protocol. At the end of the
protocol, the browser either (a) holds an ECDSA signature on
m that is indistinguishable from an honestly generated ECDSA
signature using sk on m or (b) outputs “token failure.” Crucially,
our signing protocol is extremely efficient: it requires the token
to perform only two exponentiations in the group, while ECDSA
requires one.
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Finally, we make one privacy improvement to the standard U2F
token design. As described in Section 2, to prevent cloning attacks,
the U2F token includes a counter value in each authentication
message it sends to the relying party. To use a minimal amount
of non-volatile storage on the token, today’s tokens use a single
global counter that increments after each authentication attempt.
Using a global counter poses a privacy risk: a coalition of relying
parties can use this counter value as a fingerprint to track a single
user as she authenticates to different services around the Web.
Using per-identity counters would protect against fingerprint-
ing, but could require a large amount of storage space. Because of
hardware constraints we describe in Section 5, today’s tokens use
2× 2KB flash pages to store a single 23-bit counter. Using this
strategy to implement 100 per-identity counters would require
400KB of non-volatile storage—consuming almost all of our
token’s 512KB flash bank.
To allow for the use of distinct per-identity counters while
respecting the storage constraints of these weak tokens, we
introduce a flash-optimized counter data structure (Section 5).
Our design, which is inspired by log-structured file systems and
indexes [3, 4, 42, 43, 83, 102, 120, 132], can store 100 unique
counters using only 6KB of flash, while still supporting over 222
total authentications.
Putting these four pieces together yields the full True2F design.
3.2 Security goals
We now describe the security goals of the True2F design.
Protect against a malicious token. If the browser executes
the protocol faithfully, the browser protects against arbitrary
misbehavior by the token.
To make this notion more formal, we adopt a definition in-
spired by the work of Mironov and Stephens-Davidowitz on
cryptographic reverse firewalls [87]. We say that the protocol
protects against a malicious U2F token if an arbitrarily malicious
relying party cannot distinguish the following two worlds:
W1 Server interacts with an “ideal” U2F token that executes
the protocol faithfully.
W2 Server interacts with an arbitrarily malicious U2F token
that (a) sits behind an honest browser and (b) never causes
the honest browser to abort.
A protocol that is secure under this definition prevents a malicious
token from exfiltrating secrets to a malicious relying party.
There are two nuances to this definition. First, this security
definition does not capture a number of critical potential covert
channels, including timing channels and other other out-of-
protocol attacks. We discuss these attacks in Section 3.4.
Second, in our protocols, if the token sends a malformed
message, the browser may output “Token Failure” and refuse to
continue processing messages. We require that the relying party
not be able to distinguish the two worlds described above only for
tokens that never cause an honest browser to abort in this way.
We restrict our attention to tokens that do not cause the browser
to abort for two reasons:
• If the token fails in a detectable way, the user knows that
something has gone wrong and can remediate by discarding
the token and reinstalling the software on her machine.
• Furthermore, even if a malicious token triggers a failure
event at a chosen time, it gains at most a negligible advantage
in exfiltrating the user’s cryptographic secrets to the outside
world. In Appendix A, we explain why this is so.
Protect against a compromised browser. If the token executes
the protocol faithfully, it should give the same level of protection
against a malicious browser that U2F does today. In particular,
we consider an adversary that can:
• passively observe the state of the browser at all times, and
• can take control of the browser at an adversary-chosen
time T .
We require that such an adversary cannot authenticate to any
sites that were registered with the token before time T , except by
interacting with the token.
Allowing the attacker to observe the state of the browser at
all times models the fact that it is notoriously difficult to erase
secrets from modern computers [33, 39, 59]. Because of this, if
an attacker compromises a browser at time T , it can likely recover
bits of information about the browser’s state from times T ′ < T .
Once the attacker takes control of the browser at time T , the
attacker can register for new sites without interacting with the
honest token (e.g., by forwarding U2F requests to an attacker-
controlled token elsewhere). So, the most we can require is that
the token must participate when authenticating to sites registered
at times T ′ < T .
Protect against token fingerprinting. If the token and browser
execute the protocol faithfully, then coalitions ofmalicious relying
parties should not be able to “fingerprint” the token, with the aim
of tracking the user across different websites or linking different
pseudonymous accounts on the same web site.
We define tracking-resistance using a “real vs. ideal” security
game between a challenger and an adversary. In the game, the
challenger gives the attacker access to a registration oracle and
an authentication oracle. These oracles implement the function-
alities provided by the U2F token. The attacker may invoke the
registration oracle at most I times (e.g., I ≈ 100), which models
an attacker that can coerce a user into registering its token under
at most I distinct identities at attacker-controlled websites. The
attacker may invoke the authentication oracle at most A times
(e.g., A ≈ 222), which represents an upper bound on the number
of authentication attempts the attacker can observe.
In the real world, the challenger implements these oracles using
a single U2F token. In the ideal world, the challenger implements
these oracles using I distinct U2F tokens—one token per identity.
We say that the token protects against I-identity A-authentication
fingerprinting if no efficient adversary can distinguish these
two worlds with probability non-negligibly better than random
guessing.
The browser UI should allow the user to distinguish between
U2F registration and authentication, otherwise a single malicious
relying party could trick a user into registering their token
more than I times, which could subvert True2F’s fingerprinting
guarantees. To prevent this attack, the browser could alert the
user before the Ith registration attempt, or the browser could
4
prevent more than I registrations with a single token.
When I > 1, this notion of tracking resistance is much stronger
than today’s U2F tokens provide, since the use of a global au-
thentication counter in today’s U2F tokens provides a convenient
device fingerprint. We discuss this issue in detail in Section 5.
3.3 Functionality goals
To make any backdoor-resistant U2F design usable in practice, it
should be backwards-compatible in the following ways.
No changes to the relying party (server). While a security-
conscious user can upgrade their U2F token and browser to use
our new backdoor-resistant design, a security-conscious user
is not able to upgrade the software running on their bank or
employer’s web server. A security-conscious user should be able
to protect herself against faulty or malicious U2F tokens without
waiting for all of the relying parties on the Internet to upgrade to
a new authentication protocol.
No changes to the U2F token hardware. While we might be
able to achieve better performance by (for example) putting a
faster processor in the token, by restricting ourselves to today’s
hardware, we make sure that the deployment cost stays low.
Using True2F with many browsers. To audit the token across
multiple browsers, we can piggyback on existing mechanisms for
syncing web bookmarks and preferences across a user’s browser
instances (e.g., Firefox Sync). The browser can store the token
verification state—a total of a few kilobytes—alongside the data
that the browser already syncs. In this way, all of the user’s
browser instances can effectively audit a single U2F token.
The downside of this approach is that if an attacker manages to
hijack any one of a user’s browser instances (or the sync server),
the attacker can corrupt the U2F verification state on all instances.
This trade-off seems somehow inherent; users who want the
strongest protection against browser and token compromise can
always use a distinct U2F token on each machine.
3.4 Timing attacks and other covert channels
True2F eliminates all “in-protocol” covert channels that a mali-
cious U2F token could use to exfiltrate information to a malicious
relying party. This still leaves open the possibility of “out-of-
protocol” covert channels, which we discuss here.
Timing. By modulating the amount of time it takes to respond
to a relying party’s authentication request, a malicious token
could leak information to the relying party without changing the
U2F protocol messages at all [70]. Essentially all exfiltration-
prevention systems are vulnerable to some form of timing at-
tack [30, 87], and ours is no different.
To partially defend against this class of attacks, the browser
could add a random delay to U2F responses [70, 75]. The browser
could also delay the response so that it always takes a fixed
amount of time (e.g., five seconds) to complete. Another defense
would be to send a registration or authentication request to the
token only after the user presses a button on the token—rather
than waiting for a button press after the request is sent. This
modification would make it more difficult for a malicious relying
party to accurately measure the amount of time the token takes
to complete a request.
Failure. By selectively refusing to complete the authentication
protocol, the token can leak roughly log2(T+1) bits of information
to an outside relying party over the course of T U2F interactions
with the token. (See Appendix A.) To mitigate the damage of
this attack, the user of a token should discard the token as faulty
if it ever fails to complete an authentication request.
Physical attacks. If an adversary steals the token and can interact
with it directly—without intermediation by the browser—then
a malicious token could leak all of its secrets to the thief in
response to a “magic input.” We do not attempt to protect against
such physical attacks.
Other. A backdoored U2F token could leak secrets outside of
the flow of the U2F protocol using a built-in Bluetooth or GSM
modem.Or, a backdooredU2F tokenmight be able tomasquerade
as a keyboard or other input device, and coerce the browser or
some other program on the user’s machine into leaking secrets
to the outside world [113]. Physical inspection of the token (e.g.,
to look for antennas) would detect the most egregious physical
backdoors. Additional OS-level protections could defeat attacks
via USB [5, 112, 130].
4 Cryptographic building blocks
We first recall a number of standard cryptographic building
blocks and then introduce our new cryptographic protocols.
Notation. For an integer q, we use Zq to denote the ring of
integers modulo q and Z∗q to denote its invertible elements. For a
variable x, x ← 3 indicates assignment and f (x) := x2 denotes
definition. For a finite set S, r ←R S denotes a uniform random
draw from S . We use “⊥” as a special symbol indicating failure.
When G = 〈g〉 is a finite group, we always write the group
notation multiplicatively. So, an ECDSA public key has the form
X = gx ∈ G.
An efficient algorithm is one that runs in probabilistic polyno-
mial time. When A is a randomized algorithm, we use A(x; r) to
denote running A on input x with random coins r . A negligible
function is one whose inverse grows faster than any fixed polyno-
mial. All of the cryptographic routines we define take a security
parameter as an implicit input and we require that they run in
time polynomial in this parameter.
4.1 Standard primitives
Digital signatures. A digital signature scheme over a message
spaceM consists of a triple of algorithms:
• Sig.KeyGen() → (sk, pk). Output a secret signing key sk
and a public verification key pk.
• Sig.Sign(sk,m) → σ. Output a signature σ on the message
m ∈M using the secret key sk.
• Sig.Verify(pk,m, σ) → {0, 1}. Output “1” iff σ is a valid
signature on message m under public key pk.
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For all keypairs (sk, pk) output by Sig.KeyGen, for all messages
m ∈M, Sig.Verify(pk,m, Sig.Sign(sk,m)) = 1.
We use the standard security notion for signature schemes:
existential unforgeability under chosen message attack [65].
Informally, no efficient adversary should be able to construct a
valid signature on new amessage of its choosing, even after seeing
signatures on any number of other messages of its choosing.
The current U2F standard mandates the use of ECDSA signa-
tures [54], summarized in Appendix B, so our protocols take the
peculiarities of ECDSA into account. That said, our protocols
are compatible with more modern signatures schemes, such as
Schnorr-style [106] elliptic-curve signatures [14] and BLS [23].
Verifiable random function (VRF). We use VRFs [48, 61, 86]
defined over input space I and output space Z∗q , for some prime
integer q. In our application, the input space I is a set of
“identities” (e.g., username-website pairs). A VRF is a triple of
algorithms:
• VRF.KeyGen() → (skVRF, pkVRF). Output a secret key and
a public key.
• VRF.Eval(skVRF, id) → (y, pi). Take as input the secret key
skVRF, and an input id ∈ I , and output a value y ∈ Z∗q along
with a proof pi.
• VRF.Verify(pkVRF, id, y, pi) → {0, 1}. Take as input the pub-
lic key pkVRF, a purported input-output pair (id, y) ∈ I ×Z∗q ,
and a proof pi. Return “1” iff pi is a valid proof that (id, y) is
an input-output pair.
To be useful, a VRF must satisfy the following standard
notions, which we state informally. We refer the reader to prior
work [91, 99] for formal definitions of these properties.
• Completeness. The VRF.Verify routine accepts as valid all
proofs output by VRF.Eval.
• Soundness. It is infeasible to find two input-output-proof
triples (id, y, pi) and (id, y′, pi′) such that (a) y , y′ and (b)
VRF.Verify accepts both triples.
• Pseudorandomness. Informally, even if the adversary can
ask for VRF output-proof pairs (yid, piid) on ids of its choos-
ing, the adversary cannot distinguish a VRF output yid∗
corresponding to an unqueried input id∗ from a random
point in Z∗q with probability non-negligibly better than 1/2.
We use a variant of the VRF construction of Papadopoulos et
al. [99], which is secure in the random-oracle model [12] under
the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption [22]. (We make only
a trivial modification to their VRF construction to allow it to
output elements of Z∗q , rather than group elements.)
The only special property that we use of this VRF construction
is that its keypairs have the form (x, gx) ∈ Zq × G, where
G = 〈g〉 is a group of prime order q, for x random in Zq . Since
we otherwise make only black-box use of the VRF construction,
we do not discuss it further.
4.2 New tool: Verifiable identity families (VIFs)
Today’s U2F tokens authenticate to every website under a distinct
per-identity public key. Our protocol needs to ensure that the token
samples its per-identity public keys from the correct distribution
(or, more precisely, a distribution indistinguishable from the
correct one). To do so, we introduce and construct a new primitive,
called a verifiable identity family (VIF).
The VIF key-generation routine outputs a master secret key
and a master public key. The master public key is essentially a
commitment to a function from identities id ∈ I (i.e., username-
website pairs) to public keys for a signature scheme Σ. Informally,
the scheme provides the following functionality:
• Anyone holding the master secret key can produce the unique
public key pkid corresponding to a particular identity id ∈ I ,
and can also produce the corresponding secret key skid for
the signature scheme Σ.
• The holder of the master secret key can prove to anyone
holding the master public key that pkid is really the unique
public key corresponding to the string id.
Before giving a more precise definition, we first explain how
we use a VIF in our U2F token design. At the completion of
the token initialization process, the browser holds a VIF master
public key, and the U2F token holds a VIF master secret key.
Whenever the user wants to register the token under a new identity
(e.g., id = user@example.com), the browser sends the identity id
to the token, and the token returns a per-identity public key pkid to
the browser, along with a proof that the public key was computed
correctly. The browser verifies the proof to convince itself that
pkid is the correct public key for id = user@example.com under
the token’s master public key. The soundness property of the VIF
ensures that there is a unique public key that the browser will
accept from the token for this site. In this way, we can prevent a
malicious token from leaking bits of information to a malicious
website via a non-random or otherwise malformed public key.
Furthermore, we require the VIF-generated public keys to be
pseudorandom: a malicious browser should not be able to predict
what the VIF-generated public key will be for an identity id
without querying the token for pkid. This prevents a malicious
browser from registering the token at new websites without the
token’s participation.
Finally, we require the VIF to satisfy an unforgeability prop-
erty: a malicious browser should not be able to forge signatures
that verify under VIF-generated public keys. If the VIF satisfies
unforgeability, a malicious browser cannot learn useful informa-
tion about the token’s secrets, even after it watches the token
authenticate to many websites.
Hierarchical wallets [122], used in Bitcoin, are closely related
to VIFs. The key difference is that hierarchical wallet schemes
either (a) do not allow the holder of a public key pkid to verify
that it is the unique key corresponding to a master public key
mpk, or (b) do not satisfy Σ-pseudorandomness, defined below.
Both properties are crucial for our application.
Syntax and definitions. A VIF is a triple of efficient al-
gorithms, defined with respect to a signature scheme Σ =
(Sig.KeyGen, Sig.Sign, Sig.Verify):
• VIF.KeyGen() → (msk,mpk). Output a master secret key
msk and a master public key mpk.
• VIF.Eval(msk, id) → (skid, pkid, pi). Given an identity string
id ∈ I, output the keypair (skid, pkid) corresponding to that
identity, as well as a proof pi that pkid is well formed. The
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keypair (skid, pkid) must be a valid keypair for the signature
scheme Σ.
• VIF.Verify(mpk, id, pkid, pi) → {0, 1}. Verify that pkid is the
public key for identity id ∈ I corresponding to master public
key mpk using the proof pi. Return “1” iff the proof is valid.
The last two algorithms are deterministic.
We require the following four security properties to hold. The
first two properties are almost identical to the properties required
from a VRF. The last two properties are new, so we define them
formally in Appendix C.2.
• Completeness. For any (msk,mpk) output by VIF.KeyGen
and any identity id ∈ I, if (skid, pkid, piid) ←
VIF.Eval(msk, id) then VIF.Verify(mpk, id, pkid, piid) = 1.
• Soundness. For all efficient adversaries A, if we
sample (msk,mpk) ← VIF.KeyGen() and then run
A(msk,mpk), the probability that A outputs two identity-
key-proof triples (id, pkid, pi) and (id, pk′id, pi′) such that
pkid , pk
′
id and VIF.Verify(mpk, id, pkid, pi) = 1 and
VIF.Verify(mpk, id, pk′id, pi′) = 1, is negligible in the (im-
plicit) security parameter.
• Σ-Pseudorandomness. Even if the adversary can see many
Σ-type signature public keys {pkid1, pkid2, . . . } for identities
of its choosing, and even if the adversary can see Σ-type
signatures on messages of its choosing using the corre-
sponding secret keys {skid1, skid2, . . . }, the adversary still
cannot distinguish the true public key pkid∗ for some identity
id∗ < {id1, id2, . . . } from a fresh public key pkrand output
by Sig.KeyGen() with probability non-negligibly more than
1/2.
This holds even if the adversary may ask for signatures under
the secret key corresponding to the challenge public key
(which is either pkid∗ or pkrand).
• Σ-Unforgeability. The keypairs output by VIF.Eval(msk, ·)
are safe to use as Σ-type signing keypairs. In particular, even
if the adversary can see many Σ-type public keys output
by VIF.Eval(msk, ·) for identities of its choosing, and even
if the adversary can see Σ-type signatures on messages
{m1,m2, . . . } of its choosing using the corresponding secret
keys, the adversary still cannot produce a signature forgery,
namely a triple (id∗,m∗, σ∗) such that (a) the adversary never
asked for a signature on m∗ under identity id∗ and (b) σ∗ is
a valid signature on message m∗ under the public key pkid∗
that VIF.Eval(msk, id∗) outputs.
Our construction. Our construction of a VIF for the ECDSA
signature scheme appears as Figure 3. To sketch the idea behind
the construction: the master public key consists of a standard
ECDSA public key X = gx and a VRF public key. To generate
the public key for an identity id ∈ I, the VIF evaluator applies a
VRF to id to get a scalar y ∈ Zq . The public key for identity id is
then Xy ∈ G.
The completeness and soundness of this VIF construction
follow immediately from the completeness and soundness of
the underlying VRF. We prove the following theorem in Ap-
pendix C.3, as Theorems 5 and 8:
Our VIF construction for ECDSA. The ECDSA signature
scheme uses a group G of prime order q. An ECDSA keypair
is a pair (y, gy) ∈ Zq ×G, for y ←R Zq . The construction makes
use of a VRF V = (VRF.KeyGen,VRF.Eval,VRF.Verify) that
maps I into Z∗q and uses keypairs of the form (x, gx) ∈ Zq ×G.
We instantiate the three VIF routines as follows:
• VIF.KeyGen() → (msk,mpk).
– Choose a random x ←R Zq .
– Run (skVRF, pkVRF) ← VRF.KeyGen().
– Output msk = (x, skVRF), mpk = (gx, pkVRF).
• VIF.Eval(msk, id) → (skid, pkid, pi).
– Parse the master secret key msk as a pair (x, skVRF).
– Run (y, piVRF) ← VRF.Eval(skVRF, id).
– Set (skid, pkid) ← (xy, gxy) ∈ Zq × G and pi ←(y, piVRF).
– Output (skid, pkid, pi).
• VIF.Verify(mpk, id, pkid, pi) → {0, 1}
– Parse the master public key mpk as a pair (X, pkVRF),
where X ∈ G. Parse the public key pkid as a group
element Y ∈ G. Parse the proof pi as a pair (y, piVRF),
where y ∈ Z∗q .
– Output “1” iff (a) Y = Xy ∈ G and (b)
VRF.Verify(pkVRF, id, y, piVRF) = 1.
Figure 3: Our verifiable identity family construction for ECDSA.
Theorem 1 (Informal). The VIF construction of Section 4.2 sat-
isfies Σ-pseudorandomness and Σ-unforgeability in the random-
oracle model, when Σ is the Idealized ECDSA signature scheme
of Appendix B, instantiated (1) with a secure VRF and (2) in a
group in which the discrete-log problem is infeasible.
OurVIF construction is also securewhen usedwith the Schnorr
digital signature scheme [106]. The proof of security follows a
very similar structure to that in Appendix C.3.
Proving that our VIF construction satisfies Σ-unforgeability
whenΣ is theECDSAsignatures scheme is not entirely trivial. The
reason is that when using our VIF construction to generate secret
keys for a sequence of identities id1, id2, . . . , idn, the correspond-
ing secret keys are related. That is, the secret ECDSA signing keys
are of the form: (skid1, skid2, . . . , skidn ) = (xy1, xy2, . . . , xyn),
such that the attacker knows y1, y2, . . . , yn ∈ Zq . To prove that
our VIF scheme satisfies Σ-unforgeability, we must prove that
using ECDSA to sign messages with related keys in this way
does not, for example, allow the attacker to recover the master
secret key x. Morita et al. [89] show attacks on Schnorr and
DSA-style signatures schemes when attacker may choose the
relations y1, . . . , yn ∈ Zq . In our case, the y-values are sampled
using a VRF, so their attacks do not apply.
4.3 New tool: Fast collaborative key generation
Corrigan-Gibbs et al. present a protocol that allows a network
router and certificate authority (CA) to collaboratively generate
an ECDSA keypair [37]. By directly applying their result, we get
a protocol in which the browser and token can jointly generate an
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ECDSA keypair in such a way that (1) the browser learns nothing
about the secret key and (2) the token cannot bias the public key
that the protocol outputs.
We present a protocol that achieves the same security properties
as theirs, but that requires the token to compute only a single
exponentiation in the groupG, while theirs requires at least three.
Since our protocol runs on a computationally limited U2F token,
this factor of three yields a non-trivial speedup.
The master keypair for our VIF construction of Section 4.2
consists of two ECDSA-style keypairs, so the browser and token
can use this protocol to jointly generate the VIF master keypair.
The protocol is parameterized by a group G of prime order q.
At the end of the protocol, the browser outputs an ECDSA public
key X ∈ G and the token either (a) outputs an ECDSA secret key
x ∈ Zq such that X = gx , or (b) outputs the failure symbol “⊥.”
We use the standard notion of statistical closeness of probability
distributions [62]. If two distributions are statistically close, no
efficient adversary can distinguish them.
The protocol maintains the following properties:
• Completeness. If both parties are honest, the token never
outputs the failure symbol “⊥.”
• Bias-free. At the conclusion of a protocol run, the following
two properties hold:
– If the browser is honest, it holds a public key drawn
from a distribution that is statistically close to uniform
over G.
– If the token is honest, it holds a private key drawn from
a distribution that is statistically close to uniform over
Zq , provided that the browser never causes the token to
output “⊥.”
• Zero knowledge (Malicious browser learns nothing). If
the token is honest, the browser learns nothing from partici-
pating in the protocol except the output public key. Formally,
there exists an efficient simulator that can simulate a mali-
cious browser’s view of the protocol given only the public
key as input, provided that the browser never causes the
token to output “⊥.”
Withmorework, we can give a relaxed definition for browsers
that cause the token to output ⊥ with noticeable probability.
The extension is straightforward, so we use the simpler
definition.
Protocol. The protocol can use any non-interactive statistically
hiding commitment scheme [41, 90], but for simplicity, we
describe it using a hash function H : Zq × Zq → Zq that we
model as a random oracle [12].
1. The browser commits to a random value v ∈ Zq . That
is, the browser samples v ←R Zq and r ←R Zq and sends
c← H(v, r) to the token.
2. The token samples v′←R Zq and sends V ′← gv′ ∈ G to the
browser.
3. The browser opens its commitment to v by sending (v, r)
to the token. The browser outputs X ← V ′ · gv ∈ G as the
public key.
4. The token checks thatH(v, r) = c. If so, the token accepts and
outputs x ← v + v′ ∈ Zq . Otherwise, the token outputs “⊥.”
Completeness follows immediately. In Appendix D, we prove:
Theorem 2 (Informal). The key-generation protocol above is
bias-resistant and zero knowledge, when wemodelH as a random
oracle.
4.4 New tool: Firewalled ECDSA signatures
During authentication, the relying party sends a challenge string
to the U2F token, and the token signs it using ECDSA. We
want to ensure that the token cannot exfiltrate any secrets by
embedding them in the bits of the signature. If the U2F standard
used a unique signature scheme, such as RSA Full Domain Hash
or BLS [23], this would be a non-issue. Since ECDSA is not
unique, the token could use its signatures to leak its secrets.
To eliminate exfiltration attacks, we introduce firewalled sig-
natures, inspired by cryptographic reverse firewalls [87]. A fire-
walled signature scheme is a standard digital signature scheme
Σ, along with an interactive signing protocol that takes place
between a signer S and a firewall F . In a run of the signing
protocol, the signer takes as input a secret signing key sk for Σ
and a message m. The firewall takes as input the public key pk
corresponding to sk and the same message m.
At the conclusion of the protocol, the firewall holds a sig-
nature σ on m that validates under the public key pk, and the
firewall learns nothing else. Furthermore, σ is indistinguishable
from an “ideal” Σ-type signature on the message m using the
secret key sk. In this way, the signer cannot exfiltrate any bits of
information in σ itself.
Definition and syntax. A firewalled signature scheme
consists of a standard digital signature scheme Σ =
(Sig.KeyGen, Sig.Sign, Sig.Verify) over a message space M,
along with an interactive protocol between a signer S and a
firewall F . For bitstrings x, y ∈ {0, 1}∗, let [S(x) ↔ F(y)] de-
note the string that F(y) outputs when interacting with S(x). Let
ViewF [S(x) ↔ F(y)] denote the transcript of messages that F
observes in this interaction, along with F’s input.
Then the signing protocol (S,F) must satisfy:
• Correctness. For all (sk, pk) output by Sig.KeyGen, for all
messages m ∈ M, if σ ← [S(sk,m) ↔ F(pk,m)], then
Sig.Verify(pk, σ,m) = 1.
• Exfiltration resistance. Informally, as long as a malicious
signer S∗ never causes the honest firewall F to reject, then
no efficient algorithm can tell whether a signature σ was
generated using the standard signing algorithm or via the
interactive protocol between S∗ and F .
Let S∗ be an efficient algorithm such that for all messages
m ∈M, for all choices of the random coins of S∗ and F , we
have that [S∗(sk,m) ↔ F(pk,m)] , ⊥. Then the following
distributions are computationally indistinguishable
Dreal =
{
σ ← [S∗(sk,m) ↔ F(pk,m)]}
Dideal =
{
σ ← Sig.Sign(sk,m)},
where we sample (sk, pk) ← Sig.KeyGen().
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Signing protocol for firewalledECDSA. For a keypair (sk, pk) ←
ECDSA.KeyGen(), and a messagem ∈M in the ECDSAmessage
spaceM, the protocol takes place between a signer S(sk,m) and
a firewall F(pk,m):
1. The parties S and F engage in the key-generation protocol
of Section 4.3. The signer plays the role of the token and
the firewall plays the role of the browser. If the protocol
aborts, F outputs ⊥. Otherwise, at the end of the protocol, the
signer S holds a value r ∈ Zq and the firewall F holds value
R = gr ∈ G.
2. The signer S executes σ ← ECDSA.Sign(sk,m; r), using
r ∈ Zq as the signing nonce, and sends the signature σ to F .
3. The firewall uses Equation (1) of Appendix B to com-
pute the value Rabs ∈ {gr′, g−r′}, where r ′ is the sign-
ing nonce used to generate σ. The firewall ensures that
ECDSA.Verify(pk,m, σ) = 1 and R ∈ {Rabs, 1/(Rabs)}, and
outputs ⊥ if either check fails.
4. As described in Appendix B, given a valid ECDSA signature
σ on a message m under public key pk, anyone can produce
a second valid signature σ¯. The firewall F outputs a random
signature from the set {σ, σ¯}.
Figure 4: Our protocol for generating firewalled ECDSA signatures.
• Zero knowledge. Informally, the only thing that a malicious
firewall can learn from participating in the protocol is a valid
signature on the message m.
Let F∗ be an efficient firewall that never causes the honest
signer S to output “⊥.” (As in Section 4.3, handling the
more general case of arbitrary efficientF∗ is straightforward.)
Then, there exists an efficient algorithm Sim such that for
all such F∗ and and all messages m ∈ M, the following
distributions are computationally indistinguishable:
Dreal =
{
ViewF∗ [S(sk,m) ↔ F∗(pk,m)]
}
Dideal =
{
Sim
(
pk, m, Sig.Sign(sk,m))},
where we sample (sk, pk) ← Sig.KeyGen().
Construction. It is possible to construct firewalled signatures
for any signature scheme using pseudo-random functions and
zero-knowledge proofs.We develop amuchmore efficient special-
purpose signing protocol that enables us to firewall plain ECDSA
signatures without resorting to general zero-knowledge tech-
niques.
The ECDSA signature scheme is a tuple of algorithms
(ECDSA.KeyGen,ECDSA.Sign,ECDSA.Verify), whose defini-
tion we recall in in Appendix B. Recall that ECDSA signatures
use a fixed group G = 〈g〉 of prime order q.
There are two key ideas behind our construction:
• First, the only randomness in an ECDSA signature comes
from the signer’s random choice of a “signing nonce”
r ←R Zq . (In fact, r is sampled from Z∗q = Zq \ {0}, but
this distinction is meaningless in practice, since the two
distributions are statistically indistinguishable.)
• Second, given an ECDSA public key pk, a message m, and
a valid ECDSA signature σ on m for pk, anyone can recover
a value Rabs, such that, if r ∈ Zq is the signing nonce,
then either Rabs = gr or Rabs = g−r . (See Equation (1) in
Appendix B.)
In our signing protocol, the signer and firewall can use the
collaborative key-generation protocol of Section 4.3 to generate
this (r, gr ) pair in a way that ensures that r is distributed uniformly
at random over Zq . (The firewall actually only recovers Rabs =
g±r , but we can patch this with one extra step.) The signer
then uses the random value r to produce the ECDSA signature.
Finally, the firewall checks that the signature is valid and that
the signer used the correct nonce r to generate it, and then the
firewall outputs a rerandomized version of the signature. Figure 4
describes the full protocol.
We prove the following theorem in Appendix E:
Theorem 3 (Informal). If the key-generation protocol of Sec-
tion 4.3 is bias free and zero knowledge, then the protocol of
Figure 4 is exfiltration resistant and zero knowledge.
5 Storing many counters in little space
As described in Section 2, the token must send a counter value
to the relying party that increases with each authentication.
The simplest implementation, and the one used on Yubico’s
U2F token (and originally on our token as well), keeps a global
counter that increments with each authentication attempt. How-
ever, using a single global counter—rather than a counter per
identity—entails both security and privacy risks:
1. Failure to always detect clones. Say that an attacker clones a
token and logs into site S1 then S2. Then say that the token
owner (with the true token) logs into site S2 then S1. If the
global counter had value c when the token was cloned, S1
and S2 will each see a counter value of c + 1 followed by
c + 2, and neither site will detect that the token was cloned.
2. Token fingerprinting. A single global counter value serves
as a token fingerprint that can allow colluding sites to track
a user across sites. Consider a token that authenticates at
colluding sites S1, S2, and S1 again. If these sites see the
counter values (c, c + 1, c + 2), for some value c, during
these three authentication attempts, the sites can make an
educated guess that the same user is authenticating at these
two sites.
5.1 Goals and hardware constraints
We need a data structure with an operationCount.Init() → st that
initializes a fresh counter state, and an operationCount.Inc(st, id)
→ (stnew, cid), that increments the counter value associated with
string id ∈ {0, 1}∗ and returns the new state stnew and counter
value cid.
The functionality goals for our counter scheme are parameter-
ized by a maximum number of identities I used and a maximum
number of increments A (corresponding to A authentications).
Informally, we would like the following properties:
• No worse than a global counter. Counter values always
increase. Also, after performing t increments from a fresh
state with any sequence of ids, the counter value returned
(for any id) is never larger than t.
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• As good as I independent counters. As long as the user
authenticates to at most I sites, the structure behaves as if
each identity id is assigned an independent counter.
Flash hardware constraints. Any counter scheme we design
must conform to the constraints of our token’s flash hardware.
Typical low-cost U2F tokens have similar requirements.
Our token uses two 256KB banks of NOR flash, divided into
2KB pages of 32-bit words. The flash controller supports random-
access reads, word-aligned writes, and page-level erases. In flash,
an erase sets all of the bits in the page to 1, and subsequent
writes can only shift bits to 0 or leave them unchanged. An
interrupted write or erase operation leaves the modified bits in
an indeterminate state.
Because of the physics of the flash, the hardware allows
• only erasing an entire page at a time—it is not possible to
erase only a single word,
• at most eight writes to each 32-bit word between erases,
and
• at most 50,000 program/erase cycles per page over the
lifetime of the token, and
• any number of reads between erases.
Furthermore, the counter implementation must be robust to
interrupts—if the user yanks the U2F token out of their machine
during authentication, the counter should still end up in a coherent
state and the counter value presented to any site should be greater
than the previous value. This prevents a user from being locked
out of their account.
5.2 A “straw-man” counter scheme
These implementation constraints make it surprisingly expensive,
in terms of flash space, to store even a small counter.
Using a single flash page, we can implement a counter that
counts up to 4,096. To do so, we encode the counter value in
unary: the counter begins in the erased state (all 1s). To increment
the counter, we zero out (“knock down”) the first four non-zero
bits in the page. In this way, we respect the constraint of at most
eight writes per 32-bit word and we never have to erase the
page until the counter reaches its maximum value. There are
512 words per page, so we can count up to a maximum value of
512 · (32/4) = 212.
Putting two such counters together—one for the low-order
bits and one for the high-order bits—yields a two-page counter
that counts up to 224, or roughly 16 million. With a little more
work, we can make this design robust to power failures and other
interrupts, allowing us to count up to 223. Popular U2F tokens
today use a very similar two-page counter design.
As discussed above, one way to provide better cloning protec-
tion and unlinkability is to use per-identity counters. If we wanted
to have 100 per-identity counters on the token, this would require
two hundred flash pages, or over 400KB of flash storage—on a
token with only 512KB of storage total. In contrast, our design
stores 100 counters that can support a total of over 222 increment
operations using only three flash pages.
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Figure 5: Counter data structure. The log stores hashes of identifiers
(type 0) and pointers to entries in the active data page (type 1).
5.3 New tool: Flash-friendly counters
In True2F, we implement the authentication counters using a
logging data structure [102]. The structure conceptually consists
of a fixed-length table of identity count pairs 〈id, cid〉, along with
a variable-length list of identities (the ”log”). To increment the
counter associated with identity id, we append id to the log.When
the log grows large, we run a “garbage collection” operation: we
use the log to update the table of identity-count pairs, and then
erase the log.
Our implementation uses three flash pages—a log page and two
data pages—and it can store up to I = 100 distinct counters and
supports A = 6.4 million authentications. We give a graphical
depiction of the structure in Figure 5.
Each data page stores a table of I identity-count pairs, along
with an “overflow” counter coverflow and a page serial number.
The data page with the larger serial number is the active page,
and the other data page is the inactive page. The log page stores
the log. As a space-saving optimization, we actually only store
hashes of identities, using a hash output large enough to avoid
collisions in sets of at most I identities.
The counter value associated with identity id is the sum of (a)
the number of times id appears in the log and (b) the counter
value cid associated with id in the active data page (if one exists)
or the value coverflow (if none exists).
To increment the counter associated with identity id, we can
simply append the the string “id” to the end of the log page.
To save space, when incrementing the counter associated with
an identity id that already appears in the active data page, we
write a pointer into the log that references the location of id in
the active page. In the common case, when the user repeatedly
authenticates under the same few identities, this optimization
allows us to fit 8× more identities in the log.
The only complexity arises when the log page is nearly full.
When this happens, we “garbage collect” the log: We pick I
identities, first from the most recently used identities in the log
page, and any remaining from the identities associated with the
largest counter values in the active data page. We write these
identity-count pairs into the inactive data page along with the
new value of the overflow counter coverflow. We compute this
value as the maximum of the old overflow value and the counts
associated with any ids that we “evicted” from the active data
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page during garbage collection. We then increment the serial
number on the inactive data page, which makes it the new active
page, and we erase the log page.
We order these operations carefully to ensure that even if the
token loses power during these operations, it can later recover the
correct counter state. To detect failures during log updates, each
log entry is encoded with an “invalid” bit. When the token writes
the last word of the log entry, it clears this bit to mark the entry
as valid. To detect failures during garbage collection, the token
writes a special symbol to the log before garbage collection with
the serial number of the active page.
To compute themaximumnumber of increments: we erase each
page at most once during garbage collection. In the worst case,
where every authentication increments a unique counter value,
the maximum number of increments is 50,000 (the maximum
number of erases) times 128 (the number of hashes that can fit in
the log), which yields 6.4 million increments total. In the best
case, where we only increment at most I = 100 counters, the
maximum number of increments is 128 (the number of hashes we
add to the log before garbage collecting the first time) plus 49,999
(the maximum number of erases minus one) times 1,024 (the
number of pointers that can fit in the log), for a total of 51 million
increments. To increase this maximum value, a manufacturer
could use multiple log pages.
6 The complete True2F protocols
We show how to assemble the cryptosystems of Section 4 with the
counter design of Section 5 into the full True2F system (Figure 6).
I. Token initialization. True2F adds an initialization step to
the U2F protocol. In this step, the True2F token and browser
collaboratively generate a master keypair (msk,mpk) for our
verifiable identity family construction from Section 4.2. Since a
VIF keypair for our construction consists of two ECDSA-style
keypairs (one for signing and one for the VRF), the token and
browser can generate both keypairs using our key-generation
protocol of Section 4.3. When using our protocol to generate the
master VIF keypair:
• an honest browser is assured it is using a master public key
sampled from the correct distribution and
• an honest token is assured that the browser learns nothing
about its master secret key (other than what can be inferred
from the master public key).
Alternative: Load keys from an external source. A user could
generate themasterVIF keypair (msk,mpk) on a singlemachine—
separate from both the token and browser—and could load msk
onto the True2F token and mpk onto the browser. If the user
puts msk in offline storage, she can use it to recover all of her
on-token secrets if she loses the physical token.
The browser and token also both initialize a counter data
structure (Section 5) to store the U2F authentication counters.
If both parties are honest, then the browser’s counter state will
replicate the state on the token.
Token Browser
I. Initialization. A VIF master keypair (Section 4.2) consists
of an ECDSA keypair and a VRF keypair and, for the schemes
we use, both of these keypairs are of the form (x, gx) ∈ Zq ×G,
for a group G of prime order q.
The token and browser run two instances of the collaborative
key-generation protocol (Section 4.3) to generate the VIF
master keypair (msk,mpk). At the end of a successful protocol
run, the token holds a VIF master secret key msk and the
browser holds the corresponding VIF master public key mpk.
Keys← {}
st← Count.Init() st′ ← Count.Init()
Store (msk, st). Store (mpk, st′,Keys).
II. Registration. The input to registration is an application
identifier appID (e.g., https://github.com/), and a challenge
chal derived from: (1) a random string that the relying party
sends the browser, (2) the origin of the relying party, and (3)
the TLS channel ID public key. The random identifier id that
the browser chooses is the key handle sent to the relying party.
Step 1
Receive appID, chal.
id←R {0, 1}256idffStep 2
(skid, pkid, pi) ← VIF.Eval(msk, id)
pkid, pi -
Step 3
If VIF.Verify(mpk, id, pkid, pi) , 1,
then output ⊥.
Keys[appID‖id] ← pkid
// build U2F hardware attestation data
(skatt, pkatt) ← ECDSA.KeyGen()
m← (appID‖chal)
σatt ← ECDSA.Sign(skatt,m)
Output (id, pkid, pkatt, σatt).
III. Authentication. The browser receives an application iden-
tifier appID, an authentication challenge chal, and a key handle
id from the relying party. In Step 3, the token and browser run
the firewalled ECDSA signing protocol (S,F) of Section 4.4.
Step 1
Receive appID, chal, id.
(st′, n′id) ← Count.Inc(st′, id)
pk′id ← Keys[appID‖id]
m′ ← (appID‖chal‖id‖n′id)
appID, chal, idffStep 2
(skid, pkid, pi) ← VIF.Eval(msk, id)
(st, nid) ← Count.Inc(st, id)
m← (appID‖chal‖id‖nid)
Step 3 Step 3
Run S(skid,m). Run F(pk′id,m′) → σ.
Signing protocol (§4.4)
-ff
If σ = ⊥, output ⊥.
Else, output (σ, n′id).
Figure 6: An overview of the True2F protocols. For clarity, the figure
does not describe the optimizations of Section 7.2, and omits the U2F
control fields (“control byte” and “user-presence byte”).
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II. Registration with website. During registration, the relying
party sends the browser an application identity (e.g., service
name) and a random challenge, as shown in Figure 2. The token
must return (1) a “key handle” that the relying party will pass
back to the token during authentication, (2) a public key, (3) an
attestation certificate containing the attestation public key, and
(4) a signature over the registration message with the attestation
secret key corresponding to the attestation public key. The last
two fields are used for U2F’s hardware attestation feature. For
privacy reasons, the Chrome browser by default generates a fresh
random self-signed attestation certificate on every registration
and uses this to sign the registration message [35]. True2F follows
Chrome’s design.
In True2F, the browser chooses a random key handle id ←R
{0, 1}256 during registration. Using a random key handle ensures
that if the user registers twice at the same website, the user
receives two independent identities. The browser then sends id to
the token and the token uses the VIF and its master secret key to
derive the unique public key pkid corresponding to this identity.
The token returns this key along with a proof of correctness pi to
the browser. The browser then checks the proof using the VIF
master public key.
III. Authentication with website. During authentication, the
relying party sends the browser (1) an application identifier,
(2) a challenge, and (3) a key handle, as shown in Figure 2.
The token must return a counter value and a signature over the
authentication request and counter value.
In True2F, the browser sends the application identifier, chal-
lenge, and key handle to the token. The token then uses the VIF
to derive the per-identity signing key skid for this identity and the
browser can recover the per-identity public key pkid it received
from the token during registration. The browser and token can
both use their respective counter state to derive the counter value
for identity (i.e., key handle) id. Using the application identifier,
challenge, and counter value, the browser and token can both
derive the message m to be signed.
The browser and token then engage in the firewalled ECDSA
signing protocol of Section 4.4 to jointly produce a signature σ
on the challenge message m. If the signing protocol succeeds,
the browser returns the signature σ and counter value n′id to the
relying party.
One detail is that the message that the token signs includes
a “user-presence byte” that indicates whether the user physi-
cally touched the token during authentication. The U2F v1.2
specification [54] has a mode in which the user need not touch
the token during authentication. To prevent data leakage via the
user-presence byte, the browser must ensure that it is set to 0x01
if the relying party required user presence and 0x00 otherwise.
Security analysis.Weargue informally that our protocol provides
the three security properties defined in Section 3.2. We discussed
timing and selective failure attacks in Section 3.4.
We prove each claimed property from Section 3.2 using a
hybrid argument. We begin with the real interaction between
adversary and challenger, as defined in that section. We then
make a number of incremental modifications to this interaction,
arguing at each step that the adversary cannot distinguish the
modified interaction from the real one. Finally, we reach an
“ideal” interaction, in which the adversary cannot break security,
which completes the proof.
Property 1: True2F protects against a malicious token.
Proof idea: The proof proceeds in four steps. We first replace the
master public key mpk obtained by the browser with one gener-
ated by VIF.KeyGen(). The bias-freeness of the key-generation
protocol permits this change.
Then, we replace the per-identity public keys pkid sent by the
token during registration with ones generated by VIF.Eval(). By
the soundness of the VIF, this change modifies the adversary’s
advantage by at most a negligible amount. By VIF pseudoran-
domness, we can then replace the per-identity public keys by
fresh public keys output by ECDSA.KeyGen().
Finally, we replace the signatures produced during authen-
tication with signatures generated using ECDSA.Sign(). The
exfiltration resistance property of the firewalled signature scheme
ensures that this change increases the adversary’s success proba-
bility by at most a negligible amount. At this point, all the values
sent to the relying party are sampled from the ideal distribution,
as required.
Property 2: True2F protects against a compromised browser.
Proof idea: To prove the claim, we first replace the master
secret key msk given to the honest token with one generated by
VIF.KeyGen(). The bias-freeness of the key-generation protocol
permits this change.
The zero knowledge property of the firewalled signature
scheme implies that we can replace the signing protocol between
the honest token and corrupt browser run during authentication
(Step III.3 in Figure 6) by having the honest token send a properly
generated signature σ to the browser. The remaining protocol
transcript elements can be generated by the zero-knowledge
simulator.
Then, protection against a compromised browser follows im-
mediately from the VIF’s unforgeability property. That is, to
authenticate to a previously registered website without interacting
with the token, the corrupt browser must produce a valid signature
on a challenge, under pkid, for some identity id, without querying
the token for a signature on this challenge. (Here, we rely on
the fact that before the browser is compromised, it samples the
identities id from a space large enough to avoid collisions.)
Property 3: True2F protects against token fingerprinting.
Proof idea; First, we replace the adversarial token with an ideal
token. By the “Protects against malicious token” property (above),
this change cannot improve the adversary’s success probability
by a non-negligible amount.
Next, we replace our counter construction with I = 100
independent counters. The properties of our counter design ensure
that this change does not increase the adversary’s advantage, as
long as the adversary performs no more than A = 6.4 million
authentications.
Finally, we replace—one at a time—the per-identity public
keys pkid generated by the VIF with independent random public
keys. With each replacement, the pseudorandomness of the VIF
ensures that the relying party cannot notice the change. At this
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point, the adversary’s view in the two worlds is identical, so it
has no hope of distinguishing them.
7 Implementation
The source code for our implementation is available at https://
github.com/edauterman/u2f-ref-code and https://github.
com/edauterman/true2f.
7.1 System architecture
Our True2F implementation consists of: (i) an extension to the
Chrome browser, (ii) a local agent that runs alongside the browser,
and (iii) a hardware token.
Browser Extension:Our browser extension forwardsU2F requests
to a local agent process that runs True2F with the token, and is
compatible with relying parties that support U2F. We built on an
existing extension for U2F development [66]. To do so, we wrote
roughly 50 lines of JavaScript code. Our extension does not yet
sync token state via a user’s browser profile (Section 3.3).
Local Agent: The local agent runs the True2F protocol with
the token. We built the local agent on top of an existing U2F
reference implementation [66] using the OpenSSL library. To
do so, we wrote roughly 3,800 lines of C/C++ code: 2,000 for
running the cryptographic protocol, 700 for the simulating the
token’s flash-friendly counter (to enforce correct counter values),
800 for parsing and encoding, and 300 for the interface to the
extension.
Token: We implemented the True2F protocol in firmware on
a standard U2F hardware token used by Google employees.
It uses an ARM SC-300 processor clocked at 24 MHz and
has a cryptographic accelerator with an interface exposed for
certain operations (see Table 7). Our implementation on the token
required adding or modifying roughly 2,000 lines of C code:
1,400 for the protocol, and 600 for the counter.
7.2 Cryptographic optimizations
We have implemented a number of optimizations to minimize
the cost of the True2F protocols, and we sketch these here.
Browser-assisted hash-to-point. To evaluate the VRF used in
our VIF construction, the token must compute a hash function
HG that maps bitstrings into points on the P256 elliptic curve.
We implement HG using the “try-and-increment” method [23,
Section 3.3]. If P256 is defined over the field Fp, the try-and-
increment method requires the token to compute the square root
modulo p of the first quadratic residue (i.e., square modulo p) in
a sequence of values Z = z1, z2, z3, · · · ∈ Fp. As Table 7 shows,
computing square roots on the token is costly—more than 5×
slower than computing signatures. (There are other methods for
implementing HG, but these either do not apply to the P256 curve
or also require computing square roots in Fp [15, 27, 71, 114].)
The token can outsource most of the HG computation to the
browser. To do so, we take advantage of the fact that when Fp
is the P256 base field, if z ∈ Fp is a quadratic non-residue, then
−z ∈ Fp is a quadratic residue. The outsourcing then works
Table 7: Cost of various operations on the
token, averaged over 100 runs, and the ex-
pected number of each operation required
per authentication attempt. “HW?” indi-
cates use of the token’s crypto accelerator.
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Operation HW? Time (µs) Ops. per auth.
SHA256 (128 bytes) Y 19 5 5 3 5 3 1
x + y ∈ Zq N 36 17 16 2 15 1 0
x · y ∈ Zq N 409 9 8 2 11 1 0
gx ∈ G Y 17,400 7 5 3 7 1 0
ECDSA.Sign Y 18,600 1 1 1 1 1 1
g · h ∈ G N 25,636 1 0 1 1 0 0√
x ∈ Zq N 105,488 2 2 0 0 0 0
as follows: the token and browser both compute the sequence
Z . Let z` be the first quadratic residue in Z . Then all values
z1, . . . , z`−1 are quadratic non-residues. For each such value zi ,
the browser sends the token the square root ri of −zi ∈ Fp . The
token checks that r2i = −zi ∈ Fp , for all i ∈ {1, . . . , `−1}. Finally,
the browser sends the square root r` of z` and the token checks
that r2
`
= z` ∈ Fp. Since checking a square-root computation
(i.e., computing x2 mod p) is ≈ 256× faster that computing a
square root modulo p, this outsourcing is profitable for the token.
This optimization brings the cost for the hash-to-point opera-
tion down to 2.5ms, from an unoptimized cost of 199ms.
Caching VRF outputs.When registering or authenticating with
a site with identity id, the token uses our VIF construction
(Section 4.2) to compute the per-identity signing key skid. To
compute skid, the token must evaluate the VRF at the point id to
get a VRF output yid ∈ Zq .
Even with the hash-to-point optimization described above,
evaluating theVRF is relatively costly, since it requires computing
an exponentiation in G. We eliminate the need for the costly
VRF computation during the authentication phase entirely by
computing a message authentication code (MAC) [10] and using
the browser as an off-token cache. During initialization, the token
generates and stores a MAC secret key. The MAC is only relevant
when the token is honest, so the token can generate this MAC
key on its own.
During registration, we have the token first compute the VRF
output yid. Then, the token computes a MAC tag τid over the
tuple 〈id, yid〉 and sends the triple 〈id, yid, τid〉 to the browser,
along with its registration response message. The MAC tag never
leaves the browser, so the token cannot use it to exfiltrate data.
Later on, when the browser wants the token to authenticate to
site id, the browser sends the token the triple 〈id, yid, τid〉 along
with its authentication request. After verifying the MAC tag,
the token can use yid to generate the per-identity secret key skid
without having to recompute the VRF at the point id.
Since computing and verifying a MAC just requires a few
invocations of SHA256, this optimization brings the cost of
evaluating the VIF down to 0.47ms, compared with 73.75ms
when using only the hash-to-point optimization.
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Figure 8: Protocol execution time for True2F, U2F, and less optimized
variants of True2F, averaged across 100 runs. For all measurements, we
instrument the token to not wait for user touch. The standard deviation
for all measurements is less than 2ms.
8 Evaluation
We evaluate True2F on the hardware token described in Section 7
and an agent running on an Intel Xeon W-2135 processor at
3.8GHz. Our True2F implementation uses 85KB bytes of token
flash space total: 75KB of code and 10KB for keys and counters.
For comparison, a plain U2F implementation uses 70KB of space:
64KB of code and 6KB of keys and counters.
Protocol execution time. Figure 8 gives the time to execute
the initialization, registration, and authentication protocols for
True2F, U2F, and partially optimized variants of True2F, timed
from when the agent begins the protocol with the token to when
the agent is ready to respond to the browser extension.
A True2F registration (109ms) is 1.7× slower than a U2F
registration (64ms). Figure 8 demonstrates the effect of the
hash-to-point optimization (Section 7.2) during registration—
this optimization cuts execution time by over 230ms. A True2F
authentication takes 57ms, which is 2.3× slower than an unpro-
tected U2F authentication (23 ms). The cost of gx computations
dominates the authentication cost: our protocol requires four
(two on the token and two on the agent) while unprotected U2F
requires only one, to generate the ECDSA signature. Our VRF
caching optimization (Section 7.2) essentially eliminates the cost
of generating the per-identity signing key using VIF.Eval.
End-to-end latency. Figure 9 shows the total time for registering
or authenticating with True2F and unprotected U2F, measured
from the time that the webpage invokes the Javascript API to
the time the API call returns. As Figure 9 shows, the total time
0 50 100 150 200 250
Time (ms)
U2F
True2F
– Authentication –
U2F
True2F
– Registration –
23 14 110 147
57 11 103 171
64 26 114 204
109 15 110 234
Protocol Agent Extension
Figure 9: Total time to complete a FIDO U2F request.
for True2F authentication is 171ms, compared with 147ms for
unprotected U2F, which amounts to a 16% slowdown.
Counters. Figure 10 shows the time required to increment a
counter when using our log-structured counter design. When
there is no need to garbage collect the log, an increment takes
between 1.63ms and 2.35ms. The difference in increment time is
a function of the log size: to look up the counter value associated
with a relying party, the token must read through the entire log.
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Figure 10: Counter update time with
synchronous garbage collection.
Tomake increments constant
time, a hardened implemen-
tation would read through
the entire log flash page—
not just to the end of the log.
To avoid triggering an expen-
sive garbage-collection oper-
ation during registration or
authentication, we can exe-
cute garbage collection asyn-
chronously (e.g., while the
token is plugged in to a USB
port but is idle).
The simple global counter design requires 0.43ms to increment,
compared with a worst-case time of 2.35ms for our design. In
absolute terms, the costly cryptographic operations we execute
in True2F mask this 2ms counter-update time.
Browser sync state. To support using the same token with many
browsers, True2F requires syncing state across multiple browser
instances with the same user profile. If a user registers the token
with I identities, an upper bound on the size of the sync state
is 4162 + 97 · I bytes. For the fixed state, 4KB is needed to
store the counters, and 66 bytes are needed for the VIF master
public key. Each additional identity requires syncing a 32-byte
MAC, a 32-byte VRF output, and a 33-byte public key. With 100
registered identities, this state amounts to less than 14KB, which
is far less than the 100KB of state that the Chrome browser will
sync per extension [34].
9 Related work
The threat of hardware backdoors (“hardware Trojans”) motivates
our work [111, 125]. Using dopant-level Trojans [9, 78], it is
even possible to make a Trojan circuit look physically the same
as a Trojan-free circuit.
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There are three standard defenses against hardware Tro-
jans [17]: (1) detect Trojans with logic testing or by comparing
chip side-channel information (e.g. power and temperature) to
that of a reference chip [1, 8, 73, 92, 101], (2) monitor runtime
behavior using sensors to detect dramatic changes in the chip’s
behavior (e.g. signal propagation delay) [56, 81], and (3) design
the hardware to make it more difficult to insert Trojans and
easier to detect them [31, 72, 103, 110, 117, 123]. Cryptographic
techniques, such as verifiable computation protocols, can audit a
chip’s behavior [7, 13, 18, 60, 64, 76, 100, 116, 118].
A backdooredU2F token could exfiltrate a user’s cryptographic
secrets by encoding them in innocent-looking protocol messages.
Simmons introduced the notion of subliminal channels [108] to
capture this class of attacks and Desmedt proposed “subliminal-
free signatures” [45] as a defense. Later work extended the notion
of subliminal-freeness to zero-knowledge protocols and other
primitives [20, 29, 44, 46, 97, 108, 109].
Work on kleptography [104, 105, 127] and algorithm-
substitution attacks [11, 55] models and defends against more
general malicious implementations of cryptographic primitives.
Cryptographic reverse firewalls [87] are a general technique
for defending against backdoored implementations of interac-
tive cryptographic protocols. A reverse firewall sits between a
potentially backdoored implementation and the outside world,
modifying messages in such a way that (a) preserves the security
of the original protocol and (b) prevents the malicious imple-
mentation from leaking information to the outside world. In this
work, we essentially build a reverse firewall for the special case
of U2F tokens.
Ateniese et al. show that if a digital signature scheme Σ is
unique or rerandomizable then there are very efficient reverse
firewalls for Σ [6]. Our firewalled signing protocol is a reverse
firewall for ECDSA, which is neither unique nor rerandomizable.
Our signing protocol, however, is interactive, while theirs is not.
Recent work explores two-party protocols for ECDSA signing
when each party holds a share of the signing key [49, 84].
In contrast, in our setting the token has the entire secret key
and the browser’s role is to enforce that the token samples its
signing randomness from the correct distribution. The problem
of enforcing good use of randomness also appears in prior work
on collaborative key-generation protocols [37, 67, 74].
True2F uses a log-structured counter design. Log-structured
file systems go back to the work of Rosenblum and Ouster-
hout [102], and similar ideas appear in flash-oriented filesys-
tems [40, 57, 120, 124], key-value stores [4, 42, 43, 83], and
other data structures [3, 82, 85, 93, 121, 132], many of which are
tailored to embedded devices. While much of this work focuses
on building general file systems on flash, we seek extreme space
efficiency by tailoring our design to the very specific needs of
increment-only counters.
With the rise of browser protections against cookie abuses,
advertisers and trackers turned to novel fingerprinting techniques,
such as the installation of browser plugins [51, 95, 96]. U2F token
fingerprinting gives advertisers yet another way to track users
across origins [36, 88]. The defenses we introduce in True2F
reduce the fingerprinting surface introduced by U2F.
10 Conclusions
True2F shows that it is possible to implement very strong defenses
against hardware Trojans for one important class of hardware de-
vices. Furthermore, the True2F protections maintain server-side
backwards compatibility and come with unnoticeable perfor-
mance overhead.
In future work, we hope to extend the True2F token design to
handle post-quantum signature schemes—such as those based
on lattices or hash functions [2, 16, 25, 32, 50]. A second task is
to add a notion of third-party auditability to True2F. That is, if
the browser ever outputs “Token failure,” it should also output a
third-party verifiable proof of the token’s misbehavior. An honest
token should be able to generate a similar proof if the browser
ever misbehaves. Is it possible to achieve this stronger notion of
security without sacrificing performance?
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A Selective failure attacks
In our security definitions (Section 3.2), we restrict our attention
to tokens that never cause an honest browser to abort. We explain
here why this restriction is not too severe.
Informally, say that an adversarial relying party Arp wants to
collude with a malicious token At to achieve some goal G. For
example, a malicious token might want to leak its cryptographic
signing key to the malicious relying party. We claim that if the
adversary (Arp,At) achieves goal G with probability at most 
when interacting with an adversarial token that never causes
the honest browser to abort, then the adversarial relying party
achieves goal G with probability at most abort ≤ (T + 1) , after
at most T registration or authentication interactions with a token
that possibly causes an abort at a chosen time.
Thus, if we can show that the probability of achieving G is
negligible when the token never causes the honest browser to
abort, then this probability remains negligible even if the token
triggers an abort at an arbitrary time. So a malicious token cannot
use selective failure to exfiltrate a cryptographic key, unless such
an attack were possible without selective failure.
To prove the claim informally: Assume that there exists an
adversarial relying party and token A = (Arp,At) such that
(a) At possibly triggers a browser abort and (b) A achieves goal
G with probability abort. Then we we can construct an adversary
A′ = (A′t,A′rp) such that (a) A′t never triggers a browser abort
and (b) A′ achieves goal G with probability  = abort/(T + 1).
The tokenA′t runsAt, except that on the request for whichAt
would have triggered a browser abort, A′t executes the protocol
faithfully. The relying party A′rp just guesses the index of the
interaction on which At would have caused an abort (or that At
never causes an abort). This guess is correct with independent
probability 1/(T + 1), so the advantage of A′ is at least  =
abort/(T + 1).
This argument crucially relies on the fact that once a token
fails, the user discards the token (i.e., the token can only abort
once), so it is important that the browser interface prevent a user
from continuing to use a failing token.
B The ECDSA signature scheme
We follow the concise description of ECDSA of Fersch, Kiltz,
and Poettering [53]. The ECDSA signature scheme over message
space M uses a fixed group G = 〈g〉 of prime order q. For
our applications, G is the NIST P256 elliptic curve group. The
scheme also uses a hash functionH : M→ Zq and a “conversion
function” f : G→ Zq .
The algorithms of the signature scheme are:
• ECDSA.KeyGen() → (sk, pk). Sample x ←R Zq . Output x
as the secret key and X = gx ∈ G as the public key.
• ECDSA.Sign(sk = x,m) → σ.
– Choose r ←R Z∗q .
– Compute c← f (gr ) ∈ Zq .
– Compute s← (H(m) + c · x)/r ∈ Zq .
– If c = 0 or s = 0, output ⊥ (i.e., fail).
– Output σ = (c, s).
We write ECDSA.Sign(sk,m; r) to denote the deterministic
operation of running ECDSA.Sign using randomness r ∈
Z∗q .
• ECDSA.Verify(pk,m, σ) → {0, 1}.
– Parse the verification key pk as a group element X ∈ G.
Parse the signature σ as a pair (c, s) ∈ Z2q .
– If c = 0 or s = 0, output “0.”
– Compute the value
Rabs ← (gH(m)Xc)1/s ∈ G. (1)
– Output “1” iff Rabs , 1 ∈ G and f (Rabs) = c.
In practice, H is a cryptographic hash function (e.g., SHA)
and f is the function that interprets a group element g ∈ G as an
elliptic-curve point and outputs the value of the x-coordinate of
this point modulo q.
ECDSA signatures are malleable. ECDSA signatures are mal-
leable: that is, given a valid signature σ on m under public key
X , anyone can produce another valid signature σ¯ , σ on the
same message m under the same public key X . The reason is that
if σ = (c, s) ∈ Z2q is a valid signature, then σ¯ = (c,−s) ∈ Z2q is
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also a valid signature.
Idealized ECDSA.We prove that the VIF construction of Sec-
tion 4.2 has Σ-pseudorandomness and Σ-unforgeability when
Σ is an “Idealized” variant of the ECDSA signature scheme.
Following Brickell et al. [26], we idealize ECDSA in the sense
that we model the two hash functions used in the ECDSA signa-
ture scheme as random oracles [12]. Modeling the conversion
function f as a random oracle is somewhat problematic, as f
satisfies a number of properties that a truly random function
does not. For example, for any X ∈ G, f (X) = f (1/X) (using
multiplicative notation for the group operation). Unfortunately,
the peculiarities of ECDSA require resorting to some sort of
idealization [28, 53].
C VIF security analysis
The experiments and algorithms in this section are are all im-
plicitly parameterized by a security parameter λ and we require
that all algorithms run in probabilistic polynomial time in the
parameter λ.
C.1 Standard definitions and preliminaries
Discrete-log problem. Let G be a finite cyclic group of prime
order q generated by g ∈ G. We define the discrete-log advantage
of an adversary A as:
DlogAdv[A,G] := Pr
x←R Zq
[
x = A(g, gx)] .
We say that the discrete-log problem is hard in the group G if for
all efficient adversaries A (i.e., running in time polylogarithmic
in the group order q), DlogAdv[A,G] is negligible in log q.
Verifiable random functions. We first recall the standard def-
inition of pseudorandomness for a verifiable random func-
tion [48, 86, 91]. To do so, we define an experiment between
a challenger and an adversary. For b ∈ {0, 1}, let p1,b denote
the probability that Experiment 1 of Figure 11, parameterized
with bit b, outputs the value “1.” Then define the advantage of
an adversary A at attacking the pseudorandomness of a VRF
scheme V as: VRF-PRAdv[A,V] := p1,0 − p1,1. We say that
a VRF scheme V is secure if, for all efficient adversaries A,
VRF-PRAdv[A,V] is negligible in the security parameter.
We also define a natural notion of unpredictability for VRFs.
Informally, we say that a VRF is resistant to “set-targeting” attacks
if the adversary cannot find a VRF input x∗ ∈ X that causes the
output of the VRF on that point to fall into a subset Y∗ ⊆ Y ,
except with probability |Y∗ | /|Y |, plus a negligible term.
More formally, let p2 denote the probability that Experiment 2
of Figure 12, outputs the value “1.” Then define the set-targeting
advantage of an adversary A at attaching a VRF scheme V
mapping inputs in finite set X to outputs in finite set Y as:
VRF-SetAdv[A,V] :=
p2 − |Y∗ ||Y |  ,
where |Y∗ | is the size of the set (the “target set”) that the adversary
sends to the challenger in Experiment 2.
Experiment 1: VRF Pseudorandomness. The experiment
is parameterized by a VRF V = (VRF.KeyGen,VRF.Eval,
VRF.Verify) over finite input space X and finite output space
Y , a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, and an adversaryA. The experiment is an inter-
action between a challenger and the adversary A, and it proceeds
as follows:
1. The challenger generates a VRF keypair (sk, pk) ←
VRF.KeyGen(). The challenger sends the public key pk to the
adversary.
2. The challenger gives the adversary oracle access to the function
VRF.Eval(sk, ·).
3. At some point, the adversaryA sends a challenge value x∗ ∈ X
to the challenger. The adversary must not have queried the
challenger at the point x∗.
• If b = 0, the challenger runs (y∗, pi) ← VRF.Eval(sk, x∗),
and sends y∗ to the adversary.
• If b = 1, the challenger samples y∗ ←R Y . and sends y∗
to the adversary.
4. The adversary may continue to make queries to
VRF.Eval(sk, ·), provided that the adversary never queries
the point x∗.
5. Finally, the adversary outputs a guess bˆ of the bit b, and we
define bˆ to be the output value of the experiment.
Figure 11: VRF pseudorandomness experiment.
Experiment 2: VRF set targeting. The experiment is parameter-
ized by a VRF V = (VRF.KeyGen,VRF.Eval,VRF.Verify) over
finite input space X and finite output space Y , and an adversary
A. The experiment is an interaction between a challenger and the
adversary A, and it proceeds as follows:
1. The challenger generates a VRF keypair (sk, pk) ←
VRF.KeyGen(). The challenger sends the public key pk to the
adversary.
2. The challenger gives the adversary oracle access to the function
VRF.Eval(sk, ·).
3. At some point, the adversary chooses a “target set” Y∗ ⊆ Y
of size polynomial in the (implicit) security parameter and
sends Y∗ to the challenger. The adversary then may continue
making queries to VRF.Eval(sk, ·).
4. Finally, the adversary outputs a value x∗ ∈ X .
5. We say that the output of the experiment is “1” if (1) the
adversary never queried the VRF challenger on the point x∗
and (2) VRF.Eval(sk, x∗) ∈ Y∗. The output of the experiment
is “0” otherwise.
Figure 12: VRF set-targeting experiment.
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Lemma 4. Let V be a VRF with output space Y . For every
efficient algorithm A attacking V in the set-targeting experiment
using Q queries and a target set of size |Y∗ |, there exists an
efficient algorithm B that attacks the VRF V’s pseudorandomness
property using Q queries such that:
VRF-SetAdv[A,V] ≤ VRF-PRAdv[B,V] + |Y
∗ |
|Y | .
Furthermore, B runs in time linear in the running time of A.
Proof. We first construct the algorithm B and then prove that it
satisfies the claimed advantage. Algorithm B operates as follows:
• Receive the VRF public key pk from the VRF pseudoran-
domness challenger and forward pk to the adversary A.
• Run A and forward all of A’s VRF queries to the VRF
pseudorandomness challenger.
• When the adversary A outputs a target set Y∗, store this set.
• When the adversary A outputs its point x∗ ∈ X :
– Forward x∗ to the VRF challenger as the challenge
query.
– Receive a value y∗ ∈ Y from the VRF challenger.
– If y∗ ∈ Y∗, output “1.” Otherwise, output “0.”
To argue thatB achieves the claimed advantage: When interact-
ing with the VRF (the VRF challenger’s bit b = 0), the probability
that the experiment outputs “1” is exactly the probability that
the adversary wins in the VRF set-targeting experiment. When
interacting with the random function (the VRF challenger’s bit
b = 1), the probability that the experiment outputs “1” is the
probability that a uniform random value from Y falls into Y∗,
which is |Y∗ | /|Y |. Therefore,
VRF-PRAdv[B,V] ≥
VRF-SetAdv[A,V] − |Y∗ ||Y |  ,
which proves the lemma. 
C.2 VIF security definitions
In this section, we give the complete definition of security for
the verifiable identity family primitive introduced in Section 4.2.
Defining pseudorandomness. We define pseudorandomness
using Experiment 3, shown in Figure 13. For a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, let
p3,b denote the probability that the output of Experiment 3, with
challenge bit b, outputs “1.” Then define the advantage of an
adversaryA at attacking the pseudorandomness of a VIF scheme
ΦΣ as: VIF-PRAdv[A,ΦΣ] :=
p3,0 − p3,1. A VIF scheme ΦΣ
satisfies Σ-pseudorandomness if for all efficient adversaries A,
VIF-PRAdv[A,ΦΣ] is negligible in the security parameter.
Defining unforgeability. We define unforgeability using Ex-
periment 4 shown in Figure 14. Define the Σ-Unforgeability
advantage of an adversaryA at attacking a VIF schemeΦΣ as the
probability that Experiment outputs “1.” Denote this probability
as VIF-UFAdv[A,ΦΣ]. A VIF scheme ΦΣ, defined relative to a
signature scheme Σ, satisfies Σ-unforgeability if for all efficient
adversaries A, VIF-UFAdv[A,ΦΣ] is negligible in the security
parameter.
Experiment 3: VIF Σ-pseudorandomness. The experiment
is parameterized by a signature scheme Σ = (Sig.KeyGen,
Sig.Sign, Sig.Verify) with message space M, a VIF scheme
ΦΣ = (VIF.KeyGen,VIF.Eval,VIF.Verify) with identity space
I, a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, and an adversary A.
The experiment is an interaction between a challenger and the
adversary A, and it proceeds as follows:
1. The challenger runs (msk,mpk) ← VIF.KeyGen(). and sends
mpk to the adversary.
2. The challenger gives the adversary access to an identity oracle
Oid and a signature oracle Osig, defined as follows:
• Oid(id ∈ I) :
– (skid, pkid, pi) ← VIF.Eval(msk, id)
– Return (pkid, pi)
• Osig(id ∈ I,m ∈M) :
– (skid, pkid, pi) ← VIF.Eval(msk, id)
– Return Sig.Sign(skid,m)
3. At some point, the adversary A sends an identity id∗ to the
challenger. The adversary must not have previously queried
the identity or signature oracles at id∗.
• If b = 0, the challenger runs (skid∗, pkid∗, pi) ←
VIF.Eval(msk, id∗), and sends pkid∗ to the adversary.
• If b = 1, the challenger runs (skrand, pkrand) ←
Sig.KeyGen(), and sends pkrand to the adversary.
4. The adversary may continue to make identity- and signature-
oracle queries, provided that the adversary never makes an
identity query using identity id∗. The adversary may make
subsequent signing queries for identity id∗:
• If b = 0, the challenger signs using skid∗ .
• If b = 1, the challenger signs using skrand.
5. Finally, the adversary outputs a guess bˆ for b, and the value bˆ
is the output of the experiment.
Figure 13: VIF pseudorandomness experiment.
C.3 VIF security proofs
Theorem 5. The VIF construction of Section 4.2, satisfies Σ-
pseudorandomness when Σ is the Idealized ECDSA signature
scheme of Appendix B and the VIF is instantiated with a secure
VRF.
In particular, letFG,VECDSA be the VIF construction of Section 4.2
instantiated with cyclic group G of prime order q and a VRF
V with output space Z∗q . Then, for every efficient algorithm A
attacking the VIF pseudorandomness of FG,VECDSA using at most
Qsig signing-oracle queries andQid identity-oracle queries there
exists an efficient algorithmB attackingV using at mostQid+Qsig
VRF queries, such that:
VIF-PRAdv[A,FG,VECDSA] ≤ VRF-PRAdv[B,V].
Proof. From an adversary A that breaks the Σ-
pseudorandomness of the VIF, we construct an adversary B
that breaks the pseudorandomness of the VRF. Let g ∈ G be a
generator of the group G of prime order q over which ECDSA is
defined. The algorithm B works as follows:
• Receive a VRF public key pkVRF from the VRF challenger.
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Experiment 4: VIF Σ-unforgeability. The experiment is parame-
terized by a signature scheme Σ with message spaceM, and a VIF
scheme ΦΣ = (VIF.KeyGen,VIF.Eval,VIF.Verify) with identity
space I, and an adversary A.
The experiment is an interaction between a challenger and the
adversary A, and it proceeds as follows:
1. The challenger runs (msk,mpk) ← VIF.KeyGen(). and sends
mpk to the adversary.
2. The challenger gives the adversary access to an identity oracle
and a signature oracle, as in Experiment 3.
3. The adversary A outputs a tuple (id∗,m∗, σ∗), where id∗ ∈ I
m∗ ∈M.
4. The output of the experiment is the bit b = 1 if
• the adversary never queried the signature oracle on the
pair (id∗,m∗), and
• σ∗ is a valid signature on m∗ using the public key cor-
responding to identity id∗. That is, if (skid∗, pkid∗, pi) ←
VIF.Eval(msk, id∗) and Sig.Verify(pkid∗,m∗, σ∗) = 1.
The output is b = 0 otherwise.
Figure 14: VIF unforgeability experiment.
• Generate an ECDSA signing key x ←R Zq and the corre-
sponding public key X = gx ∈ G. Then, send (X, pkVRF) to
A as the VIF master public key.
• Algorithm A makes identity and signing queries.
– For each identity query id that A makes, query the
VRF challenger on id and receive a response (y, piVRF).
Respond to the query with the pair (pkid, pi), where
pkid ← Xy and pi ← (y, piVRF).
– For each signing query (id,m) that A makes, query
the VRF challenger on identity id, and receive a pair
(y, pi). Then, compute skid ← x · y ∈ Zq and σ ←
Sig.Sign(skid,m), and return σ to A.
• Upon receiving the VIF challenge point id∗ fromA, forward
this value to the VRF challenger. Receive the VRF challenge
y∗ from the VRF challenger, set skid∗ ← x · y∗ ∈ Zq , and
send Y ∗ ← gx ·y∗ ∈ G to the adversary A.
If A makes a signing query for message m on identity id∗,
respond with σ ← Sig.Sign(skid∗,m).
• Output whatever A outputs.
When running B in the VRF experiment with VRF V and
challenge bit b,A’s view is exactly as in Experiment 3 with VRF
V and challenge bit b. Thus, B achieves the same advantage at
attacking the VRF V as A does in attacking the VIF’s ECDSA-
pseudorandomness property. 
Alternative VIF constructions that are insecure. Before prov-
ing the unforgeability of our VIF construction, we give some
intuition for why we construct the VIF the way we do.
First, if we remove the verifiable random function (VRF) from
our VIF construction, it is insecure. That is, we might consider
letting Zq be the space of identities and letting the signature
under identity id ∈ Zq with master secret key x ∈ Zq be an
ECDSA signature under secret key x · id ∈ Zq or x + id ∈ Zq .
As Morita et al. observe [89] in the context of related-key
attacks on ECDSA, both of these constructions are insecure.
• Multiplicative variant. In this insecure VIF construction,
the signature with master secret key x ∈ Zq under identity
id ∈ Zq is an ECDSA signature under secret key skid ←
x · id ∈ Zq .
To produce a forgery, the adversary:
– requests a signature on some message m0 under some
identity id0,
– chooses an arbitrary message m1 such that m1 , m0,
– computes
id1 ← id0 · H(m1)/H(m0) ∈ Z∗q
s1 ← s0 · H(m1)/H(m0) ∈ Z∗q
– and outputs (id1,m1, (c0, s1)) as its forgery.
• Additive variant. In this insecure VIF construction, the
signature with master secret key x ∈ Zq under identity
id ∈ Zq is an ECDSA signature under secret key skid ←
x + id ∈ Zq . To produce a forgery, the adversary:
– requests a signature on some message m0 under some
identity id0,
– chooses an arbitrary message m1 such that m1 , m0,
– computes
id1 ← id0 + (H(m0) − H(m1))/c0 ∈ Z∗q .
– and outputs (id1,m1, (c0, s0)) as its forgery.
There are at least two ways to protect against these attacks.
The first is to constrain the identity space to be a subset I ⊆ Zq
such that |I |  q. For example, we could let I be the set of
values id ∈ Zq such that |id| ≤ √q. Constraining the identity set
in this way defeats the attacks above because the forged identities
produced in the attacks above will be distributed essentially
uniformly over Zq and if |I |  q, the forged identity will rarely
fall into the set I of valid identities.
The secondway to defeat the attacks is to essentially randomize
the adversary’s choice of identity. In our construction, this is
achieved through the use of verifiable random functions, which
we anyhow need to provide the VIF pseudorandomness property
(Theorem 5). When using our VRF-based construction, the
attacker may request signatures under secret keys xid = x +
VRF.Eval(skVRF, id), for identities id of the attacker’s choosing.
However, when instantiating this construction with a secure VRF,
the probability that the VRF ever outputs a “bad” value that
enables the adversary to produce one of the forgeries as above is
negligible. We give a detailed argument in the security analysis
below.
Preliminaries to VIF unforgeability proof. The following no-
tion will be convenient for our proof of VIF unforgeability.
Definition 6 (Useful query). Let A be an attacker in the VIF Σ-
unforgeability game, where Σ is the Idealized ECDSA signature
scheme of Appendix B. Informally, we say thatA makes a useful
query in its interaction with the challenger if the signing-oracle
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and f -oracle queries that the adversary receives reveal enough
information about the oracle f for the adversary to conclude that
its forged signature is valid.
Formally,Amakes a useful query if there exists a value R ∈ G
such that
• either:
– the adversary queries its f -oracle at the point R, or
– the adversary makes a signing-oracle query whose
response implicitly defines the value f (R), and
• the adversary outputs a forgery (id,m, (c, s)) such that R =
(gH(m)Xyc)1/s ∈ G, where
– H(m) is the value of the challenger’s H-oracle evaluated
at the point m,
– X is the challenger’s ECDSA master public key, and
– y ← VRF.Eval(skVRF,m), where skVRF is the chal-
lenger’s VRF secret key.
Definition 7 (Adversary in standard form). We say that a VIF
unforgeability adversary A is in standard form if it:
• makes an H-query on message m before making a signing-
oracle query on m or outputting a forgery on m,
• makes an identity query on id before making a signing-oracle
query under identity id or outputting a forgery under identity
id, and
• always makes a useful query, in the sense of Definition 6.
It is possible to convert any adversary A into one in standard
form by only slightly increasing its query complexity. That is,
given an arbitrary VIF unforgeability adversary that makes:
• Qid identity queries,
• Qsig signing queries,
• Q f queries to its f -oracle, and
• QH queries to its H-oracle
we can convert it to one in standard form that makes
• Qid +Qsig + 1 identity queries,
• Qsig signing queries,
• Q f + 1 queries to its f -oracle, and
• QH +Qsig + 1 queries to its H-oracle
Therefore, if a VIF construction is unforgeable against all efficient
adversaries in standard form, it is unforgeable against all efficient
adversaries.
Theorem 8. The VIF construction of Section 4.2 satisfies Σ-
unforgeability when Σ is the Idealized ECDSA signature scheme
of Appendix B, when the VIF is instantiated with a secure VRF,
and when both H and f are modeled as random-oracles.
In particular, letFG,VECDSA be the VIF construction of Section 4.2
instantiated with the Idealized ECDSA signature scheme over a
group G of prime order q with a VRF V . Then, for every efficient
algorithmA in standard form (Definition 7) attacking FG,VECDSA in
the VIF unforgeability game using at most
• Qid identity queries,
• Qsig signing queries,
• Q f queries to its f -oracle, and
• QH queries to its H-oracle
there exists:
• an efficient algorithm BDlog attacking the discrete-log prob-
lem in G and
• an efficient algorithm BVRF attacking the VRF V using at
most 2 · Qid queries
such that:
VIF-UFAdv[A,FG,VECDSA] ≤
(Q f +Qsig) ·
√
Dlog + VRF + coll1 + coll2,
where
Dlog = DlogAdv[BDlog,G]
VRF = VRF-PRAdv[BVRF,V] + (2 · QH )/q
coll1 = (QH + 1)/q
coll2 = 2(Q f +Qsig)2/q.
Furthermore, the algorithms BDlog and BVRF run in time linear
in the running time of A.
Proof idea for Theorem 8. The proof of Theorem 8 works in
three steps and the outline loosely follows the security analysis
of Schnorr signatures presented in Boneh and Shoup [24].
1. First, we show in Lemma 9 that an adversary that (1) breaks
the VIF unforgeability property, (2) makes a useful query
(in the sense of Definition 6), and (3) makes either a single
f -oracle query or a single signing-oracle query implies an
algorithm for breaking the discrete-log problem in the group
G, unless a certain failure event F occurs.
2. Next, by appealing to the security of the VRF V , we show
in Lemma 10 that the failure event F occurs with only
negligible probability. This proves that our VIF construction
is secure against adversaries that make a useful query and
that make only a single f -oracle or signing-oracle query.
3. Finally, we show in Lemma 11 how to convert an algorithm
that breaks theVIF unforgeability property using an arbitrary
number of f - or signing-oracle queries into one that makes
a useful query and that makes at most a single query to these
two oracles in total.
Putting these three steps together completes the proof. 
Define VIF-UFAdvsingle[A,FG,VECDSA] to be the VIF unforge-
ability advantage of algorithm A at attacking FG,VECDSA when the
algorithmA is constrained to make at most either a single useful
signing-oracle query or a single useful f -oracle query. (The
algorithm A may make any number of identity- or H-oracle
queries.)
Then we first claim that:
Lemma 9. Let FG,VECDSA be the VIF construction of Section 4.2
instantiated with the Idealized ECDSA signature scheme over
a group G of prime order q with a VRF V . Let A be a efficient
algorithm A attacking FG,VECDSA that:
• makes at most Qid identity queries,
• makes at most QH H-oracle queries,
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• makes either a single signing-oracle query or a single f -
oracle query, and
• makes a useful query, in the sense of Definition 6.
Then there exists:
• an efficient algorithm BDlog attacking the discrete-log prob-
lem in G and
• an efficient algorithm BVRF attacking the VRF V using at
most 2 · Qid queries
such that:
VIF-UFAdvsingle[A,FG,VECDSA] ≤
√
Dlog + VRF + coll1,
where Dlog, VRF, and coll1 are as in Theorem 8.
Furthermore, the algorithms BDlog and BVRF run in time
linear in the running time of A.
Proof. We prove the lemma by showing that if the adversary
produces a valid VIF forgery after making a single query to the
f -oracle or signing oracle, we can rewind the adversary and
replay it to get a second forgery relative to the same point on the
f -oracle. Then, using these two valid forgeries, we can extract
the discrete log of the master ECDSA public key.
We prove the lemma with a sequence of games, defined over a
shared probability space, in which the adversary interacts with a
challenger.We useWi to denote the event that the adversary “wins”
in Game i, where we will define the winning event differently for
each game.
Game 0. In this game, the adversary A interacts with the VIF
unforgeability challenger in the setting in which the adversary
may make at most a single f -oracle query or signing-oracle
query. The challenger responds to the adversary’s f -oracle and
H-oracle queries by lazily defining the values of these random
oracles and by remembering its past responses so that it can reply
consistently.
We implement the Game-0 challenger slightly differently than
the VIF challenger in that, if the adversary makes a signing-
oracle query, the challenger generates the signature in response
by programming the f -oracle. In other words, the challenger does
not use the secret ECDSA signing key to produce the response
to the adversary’s signing query.
That is, in response to a signing query on identity id and
message m, the challenger computes y ← VRF.Eval(skVRF, id),
chooses c, s←R Z∗q , and computes
R← (gH(m) · Xyc)1/s ∈ G,
where X is the challenger’s master ECDSA public key. (If R is the
identity element in G, the challenger computes a new signature
with fresh randomness.) The challenger then defines f (R) := c.
Since we only allow A to make a single f -oracle or signing
query, the value f (R) will always be undefined at the point at
which the challenger sets f (R) := c.
Wemust argue that the ECDSA signatures produced in this way
are indistinguishable to the adversary from signatures produced
using the secret ECDSA signing key. To do so, observe that a true
signature (c, s) is computed by sampling r ←R Z∗q , computing
c ← f (gr ) and setting s ← (H(m) + xyc)/r ∈ Z∗q , where x is
the master ECDSA secret key.
The values r and c = f (gr ) are distributed independently and
uniformly at random over Z∗q , over the choice of the random
oracle f . Each choice of the pair (r, c) fixes a unique non-zero
signature value s. When we program the random oracle, we
execute exactly the same sampling procedure just in a different
order: choose non-zero c and s at random from Z∗q and compute
the unique r (or R = gr ) that causes the signature to be valid
relative to the oracle f . Therefore, the signatures that the Game-
0 challenger gives to the adversary are indistinguishable from
ECDSA signatures generated using the secret signing key.
We say that the adversary wins in Game 0 if it outputs a valid
VIF forgery, according to the winning condition of Experiment 4.
We have, by definition,
Pr[W0] = VIF-UFAdvsingle[A,FG,VECDSA]. (2)
Game 1. In Game 1, we modify the winning condition to require
that the output of the H-oracle is never zero. We require this
condition to hold for the proof of Lemma 10. Since the adversary
can make at most QH H-oracle queries, and since each has a
probability 1/q of being zero, we have
|Pr[W0] − Pr[W1]| ≤ QH/q.
(Since we have already assumed that the adversary is in standard
form, as inDefinition 7, answering the adversary’s signing queries
does not require fixing any more points in the H-oracle.)
Game 2. In Game 2, we modify both the experiment and the
winning condition. In particular, the challenger runs the adversary
A until it outputs a forgery.
• If the adversary has made a signing-oracle query, the chal-
lenger does not run the adversary again.
• If the adversary has made an f -oracle query, the challenger
rewinds the adversary to the point after the adversary made
its f -oracle query but before the challenger responded to the
adversary’s query.
Let R ∈ G be the adversary’s f -oracle query. The challenger
chooses a fresh response c1 ←R Zq to the f -oracle query,
redefines f (R) := c1, and returns c1 to the adversary as the
response to its f -oracle query. The challenger then continues
the execution of A until it outputs a forgery.
In the latter case, we can think of the challenger as “forking” the
execution of the algorithm A at the point at which the challenger
responds to the adversary’s f -oracle query. We say that the first
execution ofA after this forking point is the “left fork” (in which
f (R) = c0) and the second execution of A after the forking
point (in which f (R) = c1) is the “right fork.” In the two forks,
whenever c0 , c1, the adversary will be interacting with different
f -oracles.
In Game 2, the winning condition is as in Game 0, except that
to win in Game 2, the adversary must additionally either:
• make a signing-oracle query, or
• make an f -oracle query, c0 , c1, and the adversary must
produce a forgery in both forks.
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Let Pr[W1] =  and let Pr[W2] =  ′. By the Rewinding
Lemma [24],  ′ ≥ 2 − /q. Assume, without loss of generality,
that  ≥ 1/q. Then
 ′ ≥ 2 − /q = 2 − 2/q + /q
≥ 2 − 2/q + 1/q2 = ( − 1/q)2
and we conclude that  ≥ √ ′ + 1/q, or that
Pr[W1] ≤
√
Pr[W2] + 1/q.
Game 3. In Game 3, we modify the winning criteria of Game 2
by adding an additional condition.
From the forgeries that the adversary produces in the two
forks of the execution, we will be able to extract the discrete log
of the ECDSA master public key. However, this extraction will
fail if a certain linear relation holds amongst the outputs of the
adversary’s identity- and random-oracle queries. In Game 3, we
argue that no efficient adversary can cause this bad linear relation
to hold often.
Game 3 proceeds as the prior game, except that at the conclu-
sion of the game, the challenger performs an additional check on
the adversary’s forgeries.
We define two identity-message-signature triples:
T0 = (id0,m0, (c0, s0)) and T1 = (id1,m1, (c1, s1)).
The challenger defines these triples differently depending on the
adversary’s behavior:
• If the adversary makes a signing-oracle query, then T0
consists of the adversary’s signing-oracle query (id0,m0)
and the signing-oracle’s response (c0, s0) and T1 consists of
the adversary’s left-fork forgery.
• If the adversary makes an f -oracle query, then T0 consists
of the adversary’s left-fork forgery and T1 consists of the
adversary’s right-fork forgery.
Using its VRF secret key skVRF, the challenger computes:
y0 ← VRF.Eval(skVRF, id0)
y1 ← VRF.Eval(skVRF, id1)
r0 ← (H(m0) + c0y0x)/s0 ∈ Zq
r1 ← (H(m1) + c1y1x)/s1 ∈ Zq .
(Observe that the inverses of s0 and s1 inZq are well defined since
these values are both components of valid ECDSA signatures.)
We say that the adversary wins in Game 3 if it wins in Game 2
and also
c0y0
s0
,
c1y
s1
∈ Zq . (3)
In Lemma 10, we construct an efficient algorithm BVRF at-
tacking the VRF V using at most 2 · Qid VRF queries such
that
|Pr[W2] − Pr[W3]| ≤ VRF-SetAdv[BVRF,V] + 2 · QHq .
Final reduction. Now, we use the adversary A of Game 3 to
construct an efficient algorithm BDlog such that
Pr[W3] = DlogAdv[BDlog,G].
The adversary BDlog executes the following steps:
• Receive a pair (g, X) ∈ G2 from the discrete-log challenger.
• RunA, playing the role of theGame 3 challenger. To generate
the VIF master public key, sample a fresh VRF keypair
(skVRF, pkVRF) ← VRF.KeyGen()
and set mpk← (X, pkVRF), where X ∈ G is the value from
the discrete-log challenger. Send the VIF master public key
mpk to A.
• Answer A’s H-oracle and f -oracle queries using a table.
• Answer A’s identity-oracle queries using the VRF secret
key skVRF.
• Answer A’s oracle signing query by programming the f -
oracle as inGame 0. In this way, the reduction can answerA’s
signing query without knowing the secret ECDSA signing
key (i.e., the discrete log of the challenge point X ∈ G).
• Finally A outputs forgeries (id0,m0, σ0) and (id1,m1, σ1).
Now, whenever A wins in Game 3, algorithm BDlog recovers
two valid forgeries as in Game 3,
T0 = (id0,m0, (c0, s0)) and T1 = (id1,m1, (c1, s1)),
and we define these two forgeries as in Game 3. As in Game 3,
define
y0 ← VRF.Eval(skVRF, id0)
y1 ← VRF.Eval(skVRF, id1).
The algorithmBDlog operates differently depending onwhether
(I) makes a single signing-oracle query or (II) the algorithm A
makes a single f -oracle query. We treat the two cases separately.
Case I: Adversary makes a signing-oracle query. When the
adversary makes a signing-oracle query, we can extract a discrete
log from (a) the response to the adversary’s signing-oracle query
and (b) the adversary’s left-fork forgery.
Let R ← (gH(m1)Xc1y1 )1/s1 ∈ G. Since the adversary makes
a useful query, it must be that f (R) is defined at the end of
the experiment. Because the adversary may make at most one
signing-oracle query, the f -oracle is only defined at a single
point R, and the response to the adversary’s signing-oracle query
must satisfy:
R = (gH(m0)Xc0y0 )1/s0 ∈ G.
Therefore,
(gH(m0)Xc0y0 )1/s0 = (gH(m1)Xc1y1 )1/s1 ∈ G
which implies that
H(m0)
s0
+
c0y0
s0
· x = H(m1)
s1
+
c1y1
s1
· x ∈ Zq .
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By the winning condition in Game 3, we have that c0y0/s0 −
c1y1/s1 , 0, which implies that we can compute:
x =
(
H(m0)
s0
− H(m1)
s1
)
·
(
c1y1
s1
− c0y0
s0
)−1
∈ Zq .
The algorithm BDlog outputs this value x ∈ Zq .
Case II: Adversary makes an f -oracle query. By the hypothesis
of the lemma, we know that the adversary makes a useful f -oracle
query, which implies that the adversary makes a single query to
f at the point R = (gH(m0)Xc0y0 )1/s0 ∈ G. Furthermore, since
this condition holds for both forks of the execution, we have that
R = (gH(m0)Xc0y0 )1/s0 and R = (gH(m1)Xc1y1 )1/s1,
where (g, X) ∈ G2 is the discrete-log challenge. (Notice that the
inverses of s0 and s1 in Zq are well defined because they are
components of valid ECDSA signatures.)
We now have a relation
(gH(m0)Xc0y0 )1/s0 = (gH(m1)Xc1y1 )1/s1 ∈ G
and, as in Case I, the winning condition in Game 3 implies that
we can solve this linear relation in the exponent for the discrete
log x ∈ Zq . 
We now argue that the failure event in Game 3 of Lemma 9 can-
not happen often, as long as we instantiate the VIF construction
with a secure VRF.
Lemma 10. LetW2 andW3 be the events defined in the proof of
Lemma 9. Then there exists an algorithm BVRF attacking VRF V
making 2 · Qid VRF queries such that
|Pr[W2] − Pr[W3]| ≤ Qid · VRF-PRAdv[BVRF,V] + 2 · QHq .
Furthermore, BVRF runs in time linear in the running time of A.
Proof. Let F be the failure event that the adversary A wins in
Game 2 and outputs forgeries that cause (3) to fail to hold. By the
Difference Lemma [24], we have that |Pr[W2] − Pr[W3]| ≤ Pr[F],
so we need only bound Pr[F].
Our strategy is to construct an efficient VRF set-targeting
adversary BVRF that:
• makes at most 2 · Qid VRF queries,
• outputs a target set of size at most QH ,
• runs in time linear in the running time of A, and
• satisfies Pr[F] ≤ VRF-SetAdv[BVRF,V].
Then, by applying Lemma 4, we can construct a VRF pseudoran-
domness adversary B′VRF satisfying the conclusion of the lemma
such that
Pr[F] ≤ VRF-PRAdv[B′VRF,V] +
QH
|Z∗q | .
Since QH/|Z∗q | < 2 · QH/q, this proves the lemma.
Thus, our task is just to construct the VRF set-targeting
adversary BVRF. The algorithm BVRF executes the following
steps:
• Receive the VRF public key pkVRF from the VRF set-
targeting challenger. Generate a random x ←R Zq and send
the pair mpk← (gx, pkVRF) to A as the VIF master public
key.
• Run the algorithm A until it either makes a signing query or
outputs a forgery.
– Answer A’s signing-oracle queries by producing signa-
tures using the master ECDSA secret key x.
– Answer A’s identity queries by forwarding these to the
VRF set-targeting challenger.
– Answer A’s f -oracle and H-oracle queries by defining
these values lazily using a table.
• At some point, A either makes a signing query or outputs
a forgery. In either case, we have a valid identity-message-
signature triple (id0,m0, (c0, s0)). Compute:
r ← (H(m0) + xc0y0)/s0 ∈ Zq,
where x is BVRF’s master ECDSA secret key and y0 ←
VRF.Eval(skVRF, id0), where skVRF is the challenger’s VRF
secret key. (Since the adversary is in standard form, as in
Definition 7, the adversary queries the VRF on id0 before
outputting a forgery using id0 or making a signing query
on id0, algorithm BVRF already knows the value y0 without
needing to make an extra VRF query.)
If the adversary made a signing-oracle query, let c1 ← c0. If
the adversary made an f -oracle query, let c1 be the value of
the f -oracle returned to the adversary in the right-fork.
• Let h1, h2, . . . , hQH be the values returned by the adversary’s
H-queries. (If the adversary has not yet made all QH of its
queries, choose the undefined values at random.)
For each such value hi , compute the VRF output value yˆi
that, when used as part of the adversary’s forged signature,
would cause relation (3) to fail to hold. That is, we solve the
following two equations for yˆi:
c0y0
s0
=
c1 yˆi
s1
∈ Zq and s1 = (hi + xc1 yˆi)/r ∈ Zq .
We get:
yˆi =
hic0y0
c1 · (s0r − c0y0x) ∈ Zq .
We must argue that the denominator of yˆi is non-zero. Since
c1 is a component of a valid ECDSA signature, c1 , 0.
Then we must argue that s0r − c0y0x , 0. Since s0 =
(H(m0) + c0y0x)/r, we have that s0r − c0y0x = H(m0). By
the winning condition of Game 1 of Lemma 9, we have that
H(m0) , 0. Therefore, yˆi is well defined.
Finally, let Y∗ = { yˆi | i ∈ {1, . . . ,QH }}.
• Send the set Y∗ to the VRF set-targeting challenger as the
challenge set. Observe that the set Y∗ has size at most QH .
• If the adversary made a signing-oracle query, continue
executing the adversary. If the adversary made an f -oracle
query, rewind the adversary as in Game 2 of Lemma 9,
reprogram the f oracle, and continue executing the adversary.
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• When the adversary outputs a forgery (id1,m1, (c1, s1)), send
the value id1 to the VRF set-targeting challenger.
For each identity query that A makes, BVRF makes a VRF
query. Since BVRF could run A twice (due to rewinding), the
maximum number of VRF queries that BVRF makes is 2 · Qid.
Now we must argue that BVRF achieves the claimed advantage.
Whenever the failure event F occurs, we have that the adversaryA
gives us two valid signatures that fail to satisfy (3). Let the second
forgery be (id1,m1, (c1, s1)). Let yˆ∗ ← VRF.Eval(skVRF, id1),
where skVRF is the VRF set-targeting challenger’s secret VRF
key. Then the fact that (3) fails to hold implies that: c0y0/s0 =
c1 yˆ∗/s1 ∈ Zq .
Since the adversary’s forgery is valid, it holds that s1 =
(H(m1) + c1 yˆ∗x1)/r ∈ Zq . Then, since H(m1) is in the set
{h1, . . . , hQH }, we know that yˆ∗ ∈ Y∗. Thus, whenever event F
occurs, the output of BVRF hits the set Y∗. 
Finally, we show that even if the adversary can make many
signing-oracle and f -oracle queries, it still cannot break the VIF
unforgeability property.
Lemma 11. For any adversary A attacking FG,VECDSA, defined
over a group G = 〈g〉 of prime order q using
• Q f f -queries and
• Qsig signing-oracle queries,
there is an adversary B attacking FG,VECDSA that
• makes either one signing-oracle query or one f -oracle query
and
• makes a useful query, in the sense of Definition 6
such that:
VIF-UFAdv[A,FG,VECDSA] ≤
(Q f +Qsig) · VIF-UFAdvsingle[B,FG,VECDSA]
+
2(Q f +Qsig)2 + 1
q
.
Furthermore, the algorithm B runs in time linear in the running
time of A.
Proof. We prove the lemma using a sequence of games. We let
Wi denote the event that the adversary “wins” in Game i.
Game 0. In this game, the adversary interacts with the VIF
unforgeability challenger. We say that the adversary wins in
Game 0 if the adversary wins in the VIF unforgeability game.
Then, by definition,
Pr[W0] = VIF-UFAdv[A,FG,VECDSA].
Game 1. In this game, we change the way in which the challenger
replies to signing-oracle queries. Namely, the challenger produces
signatures without using the secret ECDSA signing key by
programming the f -oracle. In particular, to reply to a signing
query (id,m), the challenger computes y ← VRF.Eval(skVRF, id),
chooses c, s←R Z∗q , sets
R← (gH(m)Xyc)1/s ∈ G,
and defines f (R) := c. If f (R) is already defined, the challenger
aborts. As inGame 0 of Lemma 9,we can argue that the signatures
produced in this way are statistically indistinguishable to the
adversary from signatures produced using the secret ECDSA
signing key.
Since Games 0 and 1 proceed identically until there is an abort,
to bound |Pr[W0] − Pr[W1]|, we need only bound the probability
of an abort.
There are at most Q f + Qsig points on f defined, and the
probability that the challenger must redefine one such point is at
most (Q f +Qsig)/(q − 1) ≤ 2(Q f +Qsig)/q. By a Union Bound
over all queries, we get that the probability of ever aborting is at
most 2(Q f +Qsig)2/q and then
|Pr[W0] − Pr[W1]| ≤
2(Q f +Qsig)2
q
.
Final reduction. Finally, we construct an VIF unforgeability
adversary B that makes either a single signing-oracle query or a
single useful f -oracle query and such that
Pr[W1] = (Q f +Qsig) · VIF-UFAdv[B,FG,VECDSA].
The algorithm B interacts with the VIF unforgeability chal-
lenger and operates as follows:
• Make a guess i∗ ←R {1, . . . , (Q f + Qsig)} of which of the
adversary’s f - or signing-oracle queries will be useful, in
the sense of Definition 6. (Since the adversary is in standard
form, as in Definition 7, at least one of these queries will be
useful.)
• Upon receiving the VIF master public key mpk, forward
mpk to algorithm A.
• As algorithm A runs, it makes queries. Respond to all of its
queries as follows, except for the i∗-th signing- or f -oracle
query:
– Respond to signing-oracle queries by programming the
f -oracle, as the Game 1 challenger does.
– Forward identity-oracle queries to the VIF challenger
and return their responses to A.
– Respond to f - and H-oracle queries by building a table
of responses, as the Game 1 challenger does.
• Upon receiving the i∗-th signing- or f -oracle query:
– If the i∗-th query is a signing-oracle query, forward it to
the VIF challenger and return the reply to A. (Notice
that the response to the signing query fixes a point in
f . Algorithm B must remember this point so that it
responds consistently to f -oracle queries.)
– If the i∗-th query is an f -oracle query, forward it to the
VIF challenger and return the reply to A.
• Output whatever forgery the adversary A outputs.
The adversary A’s view in the interaction with B is exactly as
in Game 1, so the probability that A outputs a forgery is exactly
Pr[W1].
Furthermore, since the adversary is in standard form (Defini-
tion 7), the adversary A always makes a useful query (Defini-
tion 6). With probability at least 1/(Q f +Qsig), the algorithm B
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Sim(X) :
(st, c) ← A1()
R←R G.
(v, r) ← A2(st, R).
V ′← (X/gv) ∈ G.
(v∗, r∗) ← A2(st,V ′).
If v , v∗, abort.
Else, return (c,V ′, (v, r∗)).
Figure 15: Simulator proving that the key-generation protocol is zero
knowledge.
will correctly guess which of A’s queries is useful and thus A’s
forgery will be with respect to a point on the VIF challenger’s
f -oracle. 
D Security of key-generation protocol
We now analyze the protocol of Section 4.3.
Bias-free (honest browser). If the browser is honest, then the
values v and r it chooses in Step 1 are distributed independently
and uniformly over Zq . If the random oracle H(·, ·) yielded a
perfectly hiding commitment scheme, then the value V ′ ∈ G that
the token sends in Step 2 would be independent of v and thus
the browser’s output X = V ′ · gv ∈ G would be uniform over G.
Since the random oracle H(·, ·) only yields a statistically hiding
commitment, the resulting distribution is instead statistically
close to uniform.
Bias-free (honest token). If the token is honest, then the value
v′ ∈ Zq it chooses in Step 2 of the protocol is distributed inde-
pendently and uniformly at random over Zq . Once the browser
commits to a pair (v, r) ∈ Z2q in Step 1, the probability that
it can find a second pair (v∗, r∗) ∈ Z2q with v , v∗ such that
H(v, r) = H(v∗, r∗) is negligible. In other words, an efficient
browser can only produce a single value v in Step 3, except
with negligible probability. As long as this failure event does not
occur, v is distributed independently of v′ and x = v + v′ ∈ Zq
is distributed uniformly over Zq .
Zero knowledge. Given an efficient adversary A = (A1,A2)
representing a malicious browser, we construct an efficient sim-
ulator Sim (Figure 15) that takes as input a value X ∈ G and
simulates the browser’s view of the protocol. The simulator need
only work for an adversary that never causes an honest token
to output “⊥.” To argue that the simulation is correct: Since
the adversary A never causes the honest token to output “⊥,”
we know that c = H(v, r) = H(v∗, r∗). The binding property
of H (when viewed as a commitment scheme) implies that the
probability that the simulation aborts due to the v , v∗ event, is
negligible.
Given that the simulation does not abort, the adversary’s view
is simulated perfectly: the value V ′ satisfies X = V ′ · gv , as in
the real interaction, and the other values are identical as well.
E Security analysis of our firewalled signatures
Proof sketch for Theorem 3. We sketch the proof of Theorem 3.
Exfiltration resistance. The bias-resistance of the key-
generation protocol implies that the value R ∈ G that F holds at
the end of Step 1 of the signing protocol is distributed statistically
close to uniform over G. If R = gr , then the value Rabs = g±r is
distributed exactly in the real ECDSA signing algorithm.
Having fixed Rabs, there are only two possible valid signatures
that S∗ can output that are consistent with this choice of Rabs: σ
and σ¯. In our protocol, F outputs one of these two at random.
(Since S∗ never causes F to abort, S∗ must have sent a valid
signature.) The signatures output by ECDSA.Sign are distributed
identically, since the ECDSA signing algorithm outputs σ or σ¯,
depending on the “sign” of r modulo q.
Zero knowledge. Given a firewall F∗, the simulator
Sim(pk,m, σ) operates as follows:
• Use pk, m, and σ to solve for Rabs = g±r ∈ G using
Equation (1) of Appendix B.
• Choose R←R {Rabs, 1/Rabs} at random.
• Use the simulator for the key-generation protocol (given in
the proof of its zero-knowledge property) on input R, with
F∗ playing the role of the browser, to get a transcript τ of
F∗’s view in the key-generation protocol. If the simulated
protocol aborts output τ. Otherwise, output (τ, σ). To invoke
the simulator, we use the fact thatF∗ never causes the honest
signer to abort.
To show that the simulation is correct, we argue that (a) the
simulation of the key-generation protocol is correct, using an
argument similar to the ZK argument for the key-generation
protocol and (b) if the key-generation protocol is bias-free then
R is distributed uniformly over G (as in the simulation). Thus,
the entire simulation is correct. 
27
